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NOTE
THE CATEGORICAL APPROACH FOR CRIMES INVOLVING
MORAL TURPITUDE AFTER SILVA-TREVINO
Pooja tK Dadhania*
A convictionfor a crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT) can result
in harsh immigration penalties such as removal from the United States for
noncitizens. The designation of a crime as a CIMT depends on whether
moral turpitude inheres in its elements. Administrative adjudicators and
federal courts have thus been using a categoricalapproach that focuses on
the elements of a crime to determine whether it is a CIMT. Although variations in the categoricalapproach have developed among the circuits, the categorical approach has customarily employed two steps, both focusing on the
elements of the conviction ratherthan the actions of the noncitizen. In 2008
in Matter of Silva-Trevino, the Attorney General added a third step to the
categorical approach that permits adjudicators to consider the acts of the
noncitizen convicted of the crime. This Note analyzes the circuit split that
widened after Silva-Trevino, focusing on the variations in the first two steps
of the categoricalapproach and on the Attorney General's novel third step.
This Note ultimately rejects Silva-Trevino's third step and concludes that
adjudicators should adopt a uniform categorical approach to safeguard
noncitizens from erroneous deportation and to ensure consistent application
of the immigration laws throughout the nation.
INTRODUCTION

A crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT) is a crime that is inherently wrong and has been committed with scienter; that is, a crime which
is morally objectionable.' CIMTs have had ramifications in the immigration context for over one hundred years. 2 Today, a conviction for a
3
CIMT can result in harsh immigration penalties such as deportation.
* J.D. Candidate 2011, Columbia Law School.
1. For example, premeditated murder is a CIMT because it necessarily includes an
aspect of moral culpability; passing a bad check, however, is not if intent to defraud is not a

required element. See U.S. Dep't of State, Defining "Moral Turpitude," 9 Foreign Affairs
Manual (FAM) 40.21(a), N2.3-1, N2.3-3 (2010), available at http://www.state.gov/
documents/organization/86942.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (stating
"passing bad checks (where intent to defraud not required)" "do[es] not fall within the
definition of moral turpitude" whereas murder does); see also infra notes 30-32 and
accompanying text (providing definition of CIMT); infra note 32 (discussing "scienter"
requirement of CIMTs).
2. See Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 229 n.14 (1951) (describing Act of Mar. 3,
1891, ch. 551, 26 Stat. 1084, and accompanying immigration consequences for convictions
for CIMTs).
3. For a list of immigration consequences for a CIMT conviction, see infra notes
20-27 and accompanying text.
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The number of noncitizens charged with CIMTs in removal proceedings
4
has been steadily increasing.
For almost a century, adjudicators in the Department of Justice and
the federal courts of appeals 5 have used some form of the categorical
approach to determine whether a crime is a CIMT. The categorical approach focuses on the elements of the criminal conviction, rather than the
acts underlying the conviction, to determine whether a particular conviction constitutes a CIMT for immigration purposes. 6 The categorical approach considers whether moral turpitude necessarily inheres in the elements of the offense for which the noncitizen was convicted, without
considering her actual actions. 7 The categorical approach has evolved to
consist of two customary steps: the traditional categorical approach and
the modified categorical approach. 8
In 2008, the Attorney General dramatically changed firmly established CIMT jurisprudence in Matter of Cristoval Silva-Trevino.9 The
framework promulgated in Silva-Trevino eviscerated the categorical nature of the CIMT inquiry by adding a third step that permits adjudicators
to look beyond the elements of a criminal conviction and to consider any
facts "necessary or appropriate" to determine whether the acts of the
noncitizen involved moral turpitude. 10 Although the Attorney General
claimed to be providing a uniform method to remedy the "patchwork of
different approaches" across the federal circuits," his approach in SilvaTrevino has actually created more discord in CIMT jurisprudence.
Since Silva-Trevino, the federal circuit courts have had to decide
whether to defer to the Attorney General's approach and change their
established CIMTjurisprudence. While the Seventh Circuit has affirmed
Silva-Trevino, and several other circuits have followed portions of the
Attorney General's approach, the Third and Eighth Circuits have ex4. Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse, Syracuse Univ., Individuals Charged
with Moral Turpitude in Immigration Court (2008) [hereinafter TRAC, Individuals
Charged], available at http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/moralturp.html (on file
with the Columbia Law Review).
5. Deciding whether a noncitizen's conviction is for a CIMT occurs initially in
administrative removal proceedings conducted by the Department ofJustice. The results
of these proceedings can be appealed to the federal circuit courts. See infra Part I.A.2
(describing adjudication process for CIMTs).
6. United States ex rel. Mylius v. Uhl, 210 F. 860, 862 (2d Cir. 1914) (describing
categorical nature of CIMT inquiry and using categorical approach in 1914); see infra note
64 (describing history of categorical approach).
7. See infra Part I.B (detailing categorical approach for CIMTs).
8. The first step of the categorical approach is called the "traditional categorical
approach." The second step is referred to as the "modified categorical approach." The
two-step process in its entirety is called the "categorical approach." See infra Part I.B
(describing categorical approach).
9. 24 I. & N. Dec. 687 (Op. Att'y Gen. 2008); see also infra Part II.A (detailing
background and framework of Silva-Trevino).
10. Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 708.
11. Id. at 688-89.
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pressly rejected it as an impermissible reading of the Immigration and
12
Nationality Act (INA) and as poor policy.
This Note addresses the split between the Department ofJustice and
the federal circuits after the Attorney General's decision in Silva-Trevino.
It considers the variations in the categorical approach that have developed among the circuits and the Department of Justice and suggests a
uniform solution for all adjudicators to adopt. More specifically, Part I
analyzes the concept of moral turpitude in immigration law and the variations within the two steps of the categorical approach to determine
whether a criminal conviction is for a CIMT. Part II discusses the
Attorney General's novel framework in Silva-Trevino and examines the
responses of the federal circuits. Part III proposes a uniform categorical
approach that rejects Silva-Trevino's third step. This solution not only
promotes .equal application of immigration laws across the United States,
but also addresses policy concerns to balance accuracy in immigration
proceedings with protections for noncitizens in light of the severity of
removal as a consequence for CIMT convictions.
I.

CRIMES INVOLVING MORAL TURPITUDE AND THE
CATEGORICAL APPROACH

A conviction for a CIMT results in adverse immigration consequences, including removal, for a noncitizen under the INA. "Moral turpitude" 13 is not defined in the INA; rather, the definition is provided by
Department of Justice decisions from the Board of Immigration Appeals
(BIA) and the Attorney General. Adjudicators have determined whether
a conviction involves moral turpitude using a categorical approach, with
some variations among the Department ofJustice and the federal circuit
courts regarding the first two steps of this approach.
A. Crimes Involving Moral Turpitude in Immigration Law
Moral turpitude is a term that has been used for over one hundred
years in the immigration context.1 4 Moral turpitude is increasingly used
15
as grounds on which to remove noncitizens from the United States.
The term was first used in an 1891 federal immigration statute "direct[ing] the exclusion of 'persons who have been convicted of a felony
12. See infra Part II.B (describing circuit approaches after Silva-Trevino).
13. See infra text accompanying note 30 (defining moral turpitude).
14. SeeJordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 229 n.14 (1951) (describing Act of Mar. 3,
1891, which "directed the exclusion of 'persons who have been convicted of a felony or
other infamous crime or misdemeanor involving moral turpitude'" (quoting Act of Mar. 3,
1891, ch. 551, 26 Stat. 1084)). Aside from the immigration context, the concept of moral
turpitude is also used for disbarring attorneys, revoking medical licenses, disqualifying and
impeaching witnesses, calculating the amount of contribution between joint tortfeasors,
and determining whether language is slanderous. Id. at 227.
15. See TRAC, Individuals Charged, supra note 4 (illustrating upward trend from
1996 to 2006 in number of noncitizens charged with CIMTs in immigration courts).
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or other infamous crime or misdemeanor involving moral turpitude.' ,,16
Congress continued to enact similar language in subsequent immigration
legislation. 17 Versions of the INA from 1952 onward also included penal18
ties for turpitudinous conduct.
1. Moral Turpitude in the Immigration and Nationality Act. -

The cur-

rent INA imposes severe immigration penalties on a noncitizen, including a lawful permanent resident (LPR), for a CIMT conviction, 19 such as
inadmissibility, deportation, and ineligibility for discretionary adjustment
of status. 20 A noncitizen may be denied admission21 into the United
States for a conviction for a CIMT, either by being denied a visa or by
being denied entry at the border.22 If an immigrant who has been con16. Jordan, 341 U.S. at 229 n.14 (quoting Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 551, 26 Stat. 1084).
17. See id. (describing Act of Mar. 3, 1903, ch. 1012, 32 Stat. 1213 and Act of Feb. 20,
1907, ch. 1134, 34 Stat. 898, which reenacted language of Act of Mar. 3, 1891). The 1917
Act also provided consequences for individuals with CIMT convictions. Immigration Act of
1917, ch. 29, 39 Stat. 874, 889 (repealed 1952); see also Brian C. Harms, Redefining
"Crimes of Moral Turpitude": A Proposal to Congress, 15 Geo. Immigr. LJ. 259, 260-64
(2001) (tracing history of immigration consequences for CIMTs).
18. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (INA), Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 241, 66 Stat.
163, 204 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.). See generally Thomas
Alexander Aleinikoff et al,, Immigration and Citizenship 178-82 (6th ed. 2008)
(describing immigration developments at turn of twenty-first century); Lawrence H. Fuchs
& Susan S. Forbes, Immigration and U.S. History-The Evolution of the Open Society, in
U.S. Immigration Policy and the National Interest, Staff Report of the Select Commission
on Immigration and Refugee Policy 161, 161-216 (1981) (detailing history of immigration
in United States).
19. Although a noncitizen can admit to committing a CIMT or admit to committing
acts which constitute a CIMT for inadmissibility purposes, see INA § 212(a)(2) (A) (i), 8
U.S.C. § 1182(a) (2) (A) (i) (2006), this Note addresses only criminal convictions as the basis
for a CIMT. A conviction is defined in the INA as:
[A] formal judgment of guilt of the alien entered by a court or, if adjudication of
guilt has been withheld, where-(i) ajudge or jury has found the alien guilty or
the alien has entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere or has admitted
sufficient facts to warrant a finding of guilt and (ii) the judge has ordered some
form of punishment, penalty, or restraint on the alien's liberty to be imposed.
INA § 101(a) (48) (A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (48) (A).
For a detailed list of dispositions that do and do not constitute convictions in the
immigration context, see Norton Tooby & Jennifer N. Foster, Crimes of Moral Turpitude
7-43 (2002).
20. See Stephen H. Legomsky, The New Path of Immigration Law: Asymmetric
Incorporation of Criminal Justice Norms, 64 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 469, 482-83 (2007)
(describing various ways "criminal conviction can damage one's immigration status").
21. Admission is defined under the INA as "lawful entry of the alien into the United
States after inspection and authorization by an immigration official." INA
§ 101(a) (13) (A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (13)(A).
22. INA § 212(a) (2) (A) (i), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i). This section provides that
"any alien convicted of, or who admits having committed, or who admits committing acts
which constitute the essential elements of ... a crime involving moral turpitude (other
than a purely political offense) or an attempt or conspiracy to commit such a crime" is
inadmissible. Id. For two exceptions to this rule, see section 212(a) (2) (A) (ii) of the INA,
8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (2) (A) (ii) (providing exceptions for one conviction for a petty offense
and for minors).
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victed of a CIMT is admitted to the United States without detection of the
CIMT conviction, she may nonetheless be removed for inadmissibility at
the time of entry. 23 Additionally, a noncitizen who is inadmissible at the
time of entry on CIMT grounds will not be eligible for other immigration
benefits which require admissibility. For example, a noncitizen may be
unable to establish good moral character. 24 As a result, she may be precluded from such immigration benefits as eligibility for voluntary departure, cancellation of removal for nonpermanent residents, and naturalization. 25 Noncitizens who have been admitted to the United States and
subsequently commit a CIMT may be deported. 26 Furthermore, nonci23. Exclusion, which is an immigration consequence of inadmissibility, is separate
from deportation. Prior to 1996, deportation proceedings were used for any noncitizen
who had physically entered the United States. Noncitizens that made an "entry" included
not only individuals who had been inspected and admitted at an official port of entry, but
also those who had illegally crossed the border into the United States. Exclusion was used
only to deny noncitizens admittance into the United States at the border. See Aleinikoff et
al., supra note 18, at 508.
The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA)
modified the distinction between exclusion and deportation. Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. C.,
110 Stat. 3009-546 (codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.). The application of either
inadmissibility grounds or deportation grounds now depends on whether a noncitizen has
been admitted into the United States, rather than if she has entered. See supra note 21
(defining "admission"). The most significant functional difference is that after IIRIRA,
inadmissibility, rather than deportation, applies to unlawful entrants. Therefore, if a
noncitizen avoids detection of a CIMT when being inspected for admission, even though
she may physically be in the United States, she is inadmissible instead of deportable
because she entered the United States unlawfully. See Catholic Legal Immigr. Network,
Inc., Representing Clients in Immigration Court 2-3 (2009) (" [F] oreign nationals who are
apprehended inside the United States, and who were not lawfully admitted to the country,
are deemed to be applicants for admission subject to the grounds of inadmissibility rather
than the grounds of deportability.").
24. INA § 101(f)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f) (3). Although the INA does not define good
moral character, it provides categories of conduct that preclude a noncitizen from
demonstrating good moral character. INA § 101(f)(1)-(9), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(1)-(9).
Section 101 (f) (3) of the INA states that noncitizens described in section 212(a) (2) (A) of
the INA, which includes noncitizens convicted of a CIMT, may not demonstrate good
moral character. See also Tooby & Foster, supra note 19, at 60 (noting that CIMT
precludes finding of good moral character).
25. Tooby & Foster, supra note 19, at 60. For an exhaustive list of preclusion from
immigration benefits as a result of being inadmissible on CIMT grounds, see id. at 76-78.
26. INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(i)-(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i)-(ii).
This section
provides that
"[a] ny alien who.., is convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude committed
within five years (or 10 years in the case of an alien provided lawful permanent
resident status under section 1255(j) of this title [INA § 245(j)]) after the date of
admission, and . . . is convicted of a crime for which a sentence of one year or
longer may be imposed, is deportable."
INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i). Also, "[a]ny alien who at any time
after admission is convicted of two or more crimes involving moral turpitude, not arising
out of a single scheme of criminal misconduct, regardless of whether confined therefor
and regardless of whether the convictions were in a single trial, is deportable." INA
§ 237(a) (2) (A) (ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) (2) (A) (ii).
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tizens who are inadmissible or removable due to a CIMT conviction may
27
face mandatory detention while removal proceedings are pending.
Despite its severe ramifications and long history, moral turpitude is
not defined in the INA. The legislative history of federal immigration
statutes using the term suggests that the precise definition should be formulated by administrative and judicial decisions. 28 The BIA in its case
law has distinguished between crimes that are wrong in themselves, malum in se, and crimes that are wrong because of positive government enactment, malum prohibitum. CIMTs fall in the former category of acts
that are viewed as morally wrong regardless of statutory prohibition. 29 In
addition to the aforementioned distinction between different types of
crimes, courts often base their definitions of "CIMT" on the following
description of "moral turpitude":
[An] act of baseness, vileness, or the depravity in private and
social duties which man owes to his fellow man, or to society in
general, contrary to accepted and customary rule of right and
duty between man and man. . . . [An a]ct or behavior that
gravely violates moral sentiment or accepted moral standards of
The BIA has stated that an adjustment to LPR status by an individual initially admitted
as a nonimmigrant constitutes an admission. See Shanu, 23 1. & N. Dec. 754, 756-57
(B.I.A. 2005) ("[W]e conclude that the term 'date of admission' in section 237(a) (2) (A) (i)
refers to, among other things, the date on which an alien is lawfully admitted for
permanent residence by means of adjustment of status."). Therefore, a noncitizen "may be
rendered removable under section 237(a) (2) (A) (i) based on a [CIMT] committed within
5 years after any admission to the United States, whether it be the first or any subsequent
admission." Id. at 764. But see Aremu v. DHS, 450 F.3d 578, 581 (4th Cir. 2006)
(declining to follow BIA's decision in Shanu); Abdelqadar v. Gonzales, 413 F.3d 668,
672-74 (7th Cir. 2005) (declining to accept BIA's interpretation that "every new admission
resets the clock"); Shivaraman v. Ashcroft, 360 F.3d 1142, 1146 (9th Cir. 2004) ("[W]e
conclude that the BIA erred in determining that the five-year period began to run from
the date on which [the noncitizen's] status was adjusted to [LPR] rather than from the
date on which he lawfully entered the United States .. ").An LPR who leaves the United
States is not treated as seeking admission, except under exceptional circumstances. INA
§ 101 (a) (13) (C), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C) (listing exceptions).
A noncitizen can avoid removal if she is eligible for cancellation of removal, even if
she has been convicted of one or more CIMTs. INA § 240A(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a); see
Tooby & Foster, supra note 19, at 99-101.
27. INA § 236(c) (1), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) (1). A noncitizen faces mandatory detention
if she is inadmissible by reason of any crime-related ground, deportable for multiple CIMT
convictions, or deportable for a conviction for a CIMT where she had been sentenced to
imprisonment for at least one year. Id.
28. See Cabral v. INS, 15 F.3d 193, 194-95 (1st Cir. 1994) (analyzing legislative history
of federal immigration statutes including Immigration Act of 1917 and concluding despite
realizing confusion surrounding term "moral turpitude," Congress left meaning of phrase
to courts and administrative agencies); see also Restriction of Immigration: Hearing on
H.R. 10384 Before the H. Comm. on Immigration and Naturalization, 64th Cong. 8 (1916)
(statement of Rep. Adolph Sabath) ("[A] crime involving moral turpitude has not been
defined. No one can really say what is meant by saying a crime involving moral
turpitude.").
29. See, e.g., L-V-C, 22 I. & N. Dec. 594, 603 (B.I.A. 1999) (distinguishing CIMTs from
other crimes on basis of malum in se and malum prohibitum).
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community and is a morally culpable quality held to be present
in some criminal offenses as distinguished from others .... The
quality of a crime involving grave infringement of the moral sentiment of the community as distinguished from statutory mala
30
prohibita.
Case law has defined a CIMT as involving conduct that is "inherently
base, vile, or depraved,"3 1 and is committed "with some form of
32
scienter."
There is no fixed list of crimes constituting CIMTs; rather the classifi33
cation of a crime as a CIMT depends on society's changing morals.
However, robust case law has developed regarding whether a particular
crime is a CIMT. 34 Common law has reached a consensus as to whether
most crimes constitute CIMTs: Offenses that have an element of fraud,
larceny, or intent to harm persons or property generally involve moral
35
turpitude.
30. Black's Law Dictionary 1008-09 (6th ed. 1990) (internal citations omitted); see
also Harms, supra note 17, at 264 (citing definition of "moral turpitude" from sixth edition
of Black's Law Dictionary).
31. Knapik v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 84, 89 (3d Cir. 2004); see also Marciano v. INS, 450
F.2d 1022, 1025 (8th Cir. 1971) (describing conduct involving moral turpitude as "'an act
of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes to his
fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right
and duty between man and man"' (quoting Ng Sui Wing v. United States, 46 F.2d 755, 756
(7th Cir. 1931))).
32. Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. 687, 706 (Op. Att'y Gen. 2008); see, e.g., Michel v.
INS, 206 F.3d 253, 263 (2d Cir. 2000) (stating "corrupt scienter is the touchstone of moral
turpitude"); Abreu-Semino, 12 I. & N. Dec. 775, 777 (B.I.A. 1968) (stating "moral
turpitude normally inheres in the intent"). Silva-Trevino provides that a crime involves
moral turpitude if it encompasses "both reprehensible conduct and some degree of
scienter, whether specific intent, deliberateness, willfulness, or recklessness." 24 I. & N.
Dec. at 689 n.I. Scholars contend that this definition of CIMT may be different from that
used prior to Silva-Trevino. See Nat'l Lawyers Guild, Immigration Law and Crimes, Moral
Turpitude-Change in Definition of Moral Turpitude § 6:3 (2010), available at Westlaw
IMLC ("In Matter of Silva-Trevino, the Attorney General changed the definition of a crime
involving moral turpitude ....").
33. "Since 'moral turpitude' refers to moral standards, rather than legal standards, its
definition necessarily changes over time and from place to place." Harms, supra note 17,
at 265; see also United States ex rel. Manzella v. Zimmerman, 71 F. Supp. 534, 537 (E.D.
Pa. 1947) (stating "moral turpitude" reflects changing moral standards); Skrmetta v.
Coykendall, 16 F.2d 783, 784 (N.D. Ga. 1926) (stating moral turpitude is "measured by the
general moral standards of the time and country").
34. See 6 Charles Gordon, Stanley Mailman & Stephen Yale-Loehr, Immigration Law
and Procedure § 71.05[1] [d] [iii] (2009) (listing various crimes that are CIMTs); Tooby &
Foster, supra note 19, at 209-353 (same); What Constitutes "Crime Involving Moral
Turpitude," 23 A.L.R. Fed. 480 §§ 10-13.5 (2011), available at Westlaw ALRFED (same).
35. See U.S. Dep't of State, Defining "Moral Turpitude," 9 FAM 40.21(a), N2.2
(2010), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/86942.pdf (on file
with the Columbia Law Review) ("The most common elements involving moral turpitude
are: (1) [flraud; (2) [l]arceny; and (3) [i]ntent to harm persons or things." (emphasis
omitted)); see also, e.g., Vuksanovic v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 439 F.3d 1308, 1312 (lth Cir.
2006) (holding second-degree arson under Florida law is CIMT); Goldeshtein v. INS, 8
F.3d 645, 647 (9th Cir. 1993) (stating if crime involves intent to defraud as essential
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2. Adjudication of Crimes Involving Moral Turpitude. - Removal proceedings, which can be initiated against a noncitizen with certain criminal convictions, are the starting point of the adjudication process for determining whether a crime is one that involves moral turpitude. 36 This
determination occurs in administrative courts in the Department of
Justice under the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR)
before an immigration judge (IJ).37 An J's decision can be appealed to
38
the BIA.
element, then it necessarily involves moral turpitude); Guerrero de Nodahl v. INS, 407
F.2d 1405, 1406-07 (9th Cir. 1969) (determining that beating child is CIMT); Sanudo, 23
I. & N. Dec. 968, 971-73 (B.I.A. 2006) (contending that simple assaults, including
domestic violence, generally are not CIMTs).
CIMTs can be divided into four general categories: (1) crimes against the person; (2)
crimes against property; (3) sex crimes and crimes involving family relationships; and (4)
crimes against the government or its authority. 6 Gordon, Mailman & Yale-Loehr, supra
note 34, § 71.05[1] [dl [iii]; see Maryellen Fullerton & Noah Kinigstein, Strategies for
Ameliorating the Immigration Consequences of Criminal Convictions: A Guide for
Defense Attorneys, 23 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 425, 433-36 (1986) (describing seven categories
of CIMTs). For a comprehensive list of specific crimes that generally do and do not involve
moral turpitude, see U.S. Dep't of State, Common Crimes Involving Moral Turpitude, 9
FAM 40.21(a), N2.3, available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/86942.
pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
36. See U.S. Dep't of Justice, Exec. Office for Immigr. Rev., EOIR at a Glance 1-2
(2010) [hereinafter EOIR at a Glance] (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (describing
removal proceedings in Department ofJustice). An IJ inquires into whether a noncitizen
falls under a ground of inadmissibility or deportability, including for CIMTs, at a removal
proceeding. INA § 240(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a)(1) (2006). Inquiry into whether a
noncitizen has committed a CIMT also occurs when she is seeking admission into the
United States. INA § 212(a)(2)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (2) (A) (i). Admission can
include not only initially applying to enter the United States, but also certain cases when an
LPR returns to the United States, see INA § 101(a) (13) (C), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (13) (C),
and when a noncitizen subject to removal adjusts status to LPR, see INA § 240A(b), 8
U.S.C. § 1229b(b).
Before initially coming to the United States, this determination happens first at a
consular interview at a State Department consulate office abroad. Aleinikoff et al., supra
note 18, at 650 (describing consular officers' consideration of admissibility when issuing
visas). Customs and Border Patrol (CBP), under the Department of Homeland Security,
again considers whether the noncitizen is admissible when she arrives at the border of the
United States. See id. at 270 (describing role of CBP).
37. The EOIR encompasses both IJs and the BIA. EOIR at a Glance, supra note 36, at
1, 3 (providing organizational information about EOIR). The INA mandates that removal
proceedings must take place before an IJ. INA § 240(a) (1), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a) (1). For
the history and development of the IJ position, see Aleinikoff et al., supra note 18, at
278-81.
38. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(b) (2010) (describing appellate jurisdiction of BIA). The
creation of the BIA has been by regulations, and not under the INA. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1 (a)
and (d), respectively, describe the organization and power of the BIA, including the scope
of review of appeals to the BIA 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1 (b) describes appellate review by the BIA.
The BIA can designate certain decisions as having precedential value. 8 C.F.R.
§ 1003.1(g); see also Aleinikoff et al., supra note 18, at 281-84 (describing creation,
evolution, and organization of BIA).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3251568
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The Attorney General has the authority to review cases before the
BIA, and may do so under three circumstances: (1) when the Attorney
General directs the BIA to refer a case to her, (2) when the Chairman or
a majority of the BIA decides that a case should be referred, or (3) when
the Secretary of Homeland Security or designated officials request referral to the Attorney General. 39 Decisions issued by the Attorney General
have precedential authority within the Department of Homeland Security
and for IJs.4

°

A noncitizen can challenge decisions by the BIA to the federal circuit
courts, subject to several restrictions:4 1 First, judicial review is precluded
for most criminal grounds of deportability and many discretionary decisions. 42 Further, even when judicial review is permitted, it is extremely
deferential to agency decisions. 43 Despite the limitations on judicial review, it is nevertheless available for constitutional challenges and for questions of law. 4 4 Because the question whether a criminal statute encompasses a CIMT is a question of law, federal courts may review these cases
even though the underlying claim for removal is based on a criminal
45
ground.
39. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(h)(1) (describing referral of cases to Attorney General).
40. 8 C.F.R1
§ 1003.1(g); see also INA § 103(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(1)
("[D]etermination and ruling by the Attorney General with respect to all questions of law
shall be controlling.").
41. See INA § 242, 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (regarding judicial review of orders of removal);
see also Aleinikoff et al., supra note 18, at 291-93, 1148-57) (describing history ofjudicial
review and current review standards for immigration decisions).
42. INA § 242(a)(2)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C). Judicial review is not precluded
for deportation under section 237(a) (2) (A) (i) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) (2) (A) (i) as a
result of a single CIMT. Id. However, many discretionary decisions are not subject to
judicial review, such as certain waivers of inadmissibility and deportability grounds, relief
from removal, discretionary adjustment to LPR status, and decisions listed under the INA
to be made in the discretion of the Attorney General, except grants of asylum. See INA
§242(a)(2)(B), 8 U.S.C. §1252(a)(2)(B) (providing references to nonreviewable
discretionary actions).
43. INA § 242(b) (4), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (4) (describing scope and standard for review
by federal circuit courts). When IIRIRA consolidated deportation and exclusion into
removal proceedings, see supra note 23, it also curbed judicial review. See Aleinikoff et al.,
supra note 18, at 292 (describing changes in judicial review under IIRIRA, which
established or strengthened deferential review standards"). Under IIRIRA's deferential
standards, "administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator
would be compelled to conclude to the contrary." INA §242(b)(4)(B), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(b) (4) (B). For exclusion decisions, "a decision that an alien is not eligible for
admission to the United States is conclusive unless manifestly contrary to law." INA
§ 242(b)(4)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4) (C).
44. INA § 242(a) (2) (D), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a) (2) (D). This provision, introduced into
the INA by the REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, div. B, § 106(a)(1)(A) (iii), 119
Stat. 231, 310 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 and 49 U.S.C.), retains
judicial review for questions of law and constitutional claims even for factual and
discretionary decisions under the INA. For a discussion of what constitutes a question of
law in the immigration context, see Chen v. U.S. Dep't ofJustice, 471 F.3d 315, 324-30 (2d
Cir. 2006).
45. See, e.g., United States v. Chu Kong Yin, 935 F.2d 990, 1003 (9th Cir. 1991)
("[W]e have frequently determined in reviewing deportation proceedings that the
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Even though federal courts may review CIMT cases, Chevron deference requires that courts of appeals defer to agency determinations of
what conduct encompasses moral turpitude, 46 which has resulted in the
question whether a conviction under a statute constitutes a conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude is a question of law.").
46. Because the INA is ambiguous regarding the question of what behavior constitutes
a CIMT, Chevron deference compels courts to respect the Department of Justice's
construction of the statute. See, e.g., Franklin v. INS, 72 F.3d 571, 572-73 (8th Cir. 1995)
(applying Chevron deference in CIMT context). Chevron outlines a two-step process for
reviewing an agency's construction of a statute:
First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise
question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter;
for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously
expressed intent of Congress. If, however, the court determines Congress has not
directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose
its own construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an
administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with
respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's
answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984)
(footnotes omitted). National Cable & Telecommunications Ass' v. Brand X Internet Services
states that "[i]f a statute is ambiguous, and if the implementing agency's construction is
reasonable, Chevron requires a federal court to accept the agency's construction of the
statute, even if the agency's reading differs from what the court believes is the best
statutory interpretation." 545 U.S. 967, 980 (2005); see also United States v. Mead Corp.,
533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001) (noting that "administrative implementation of a . . .
provision qualifies for Chevron deference when . . .Congress delegated authority to the
agency," such as through "an agency's power to engage in adjudication or... rulemaking,"
and "the agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that
authority").
Thus, in the immigration context, federal courts must defer to the Attorney General's
and BIA's permissible interpretations of the INA. See INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415,
424 (1999) (holding "the [lower] court should have applied the principles of deference
described in Chevron" when examining serious nonpolitical crime exception to
withholding of removal); Jean-Louis v. Att'y Gen., 582 F.3d 462, 469 (3d Cir. 2009) ("We
normally defer to the agency as to what conduct constitutes a CIMT."); Bolvito v. Mukasey,
527 F.3d 428, 435 (5th Cir. 2008) ("We defer to the BIA's interpretation of immigration
regulations if the interpretation is reasonable."); Ali v. Mukasey, 521 F.3d 737, 739 (7th Cir.
2008) (stating because Department of Justice is "both required and entitled to flesh out
[CIMT's] meaning.., and as the [Department of Justice] has done this through formal
adjudication the agency is entitled to the respect afforded by the Chevron doctrine"); see
also John W. Guendelsberger, Judicial Deference to Agency Decisions in Removal
Proceedings in Light of INS v. Ventura, 18 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 605, 617-26 (2008)
(describing Chevron deference to agency determinations for statutory interpretation of
INA).
Brand X also states that a court's interpretation of a statute before the agency has
spoken to a particular issue should be reconsidered once the agency issues an
interpretation. 545 U.S. at 982-83. The federal court's prior judicial construction will
override the agency's construction only if the court's decision holds that the statute is
unambiguous, and thus deference to the agency is not necessary. Id.; see infra text
accompanying note 112 (discussing Attorney General's use of Brand X in Silva-Trevino to
justify new administrative framework for CIMTs). For a practical discussion on how the
BIA is using Brand X to argue that circuit court decisions should be reconsidered in light of
new precedential BIA decisions, see Jeff Joseph, Mary Holper & Gerald Seipp, The
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"insulat[ion of] the BIA's interpretation of the [INA]" and, in particular,
the insulation of its definition of CIMT. 47 However, it is important to
note that although federal courts must defer to the Department of
Justice's interpretation of what crimes involve moral turpitude, they do
not defer to the agency's reading of a particular criminal statute. 48 Thus,
the courts of appeals defer to the agency's determination of what conduct
constitutes moral turpitude, but review de novo the agency's interpretation of the criminal statute at issue to ascertain whether the elements of
the statute meet that standard. 49 This "approach provides both consistency-concerning the meaning of moral turpitude-and a proper regard for the BLA's administrative role-interpretation of federal immigra50
tion laws, not state and federal criminal statutes."
The INA provides neither a definition for CIMTs, nor a method to
51
determine whether a particular conviction involves moral turpitude.
Although immigration adjudicators have been using some form of the
categorical approach for CIMTs, the lack of guidance in the INA, coupled with the fact that the Department of Justice had not provided an
authoritative methodology for the categorical approach prior to SilvaTrevino, caused discord to develop across the circuits regarding the different steps of the inquiry.52 The BIA "typically employ[ed] the [law] endorsed by the circuit in which a case ar[ose]" because "the Department
[had] not adopted a preferred methodology for conducting [the] categorical inquiry."5 3 Now that the Attorney General has promulgated a new
Importance of Finding the "Right" Circuit for Your Immigration Case, Immigr. Briefings,
Apr. 2009, at 1, 3.
47. Harms, supra note 17, at 270.
48. Federal courts do not defer to the agency's interpretation of criminal statutes
because the agency holds no particular expertise in interpreting such criminal statutes.
See, e.g., Jean-Louis, 582 F.3d at 466 ("Although we defer to the agency's determination of
whether an offense constitutes a CIMT, we accord no deference to its construction of a
state criminal statute, as to which it has no particular expertise."); Knapik v. Ashcroft, 384
F.3d 84, 87-88 (3d Cir. 2004) ("[I]n determining what.the elements are of a particular
criminal statute deemed to implicate moral turpitude, we do not defer to the BIA.").
49. See, e.g., Amouzadeh v. Winfrey, 467 F.3d 451, 455 (5th Cir. 2006) ("[W]e review
de novo whether the elements of the state or federal [offense at issue] fit the BIA's
definition of a [CIMT]." (quoting Smalley v. Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 332, 335-36 (5th Cir.
2003))).
50. Id. (citation omitted).
51. Silva-Trevino, 24 1. & N. Dec. 687, 693 (Op. Att'y Gen. 2008) (stating INA is "silent
on the precise method that immigration judges and courts should use to determine if a
prior conviction is for a [CIMT]").
52. Id. at 695-96 ("Although to date the Department generally has deferred to the
relevant circuit court in deciding which approach to use in a given case, providing a
consistent, authoritative, nationwide method for interpreting and applying ambiguous
provisions of the immigration laws, such as [for CIMTs], is one of the Department's key
duties.").
53. Id. at 688, 693; see also Anselmo, 20 I. & N. Dec. 25, 31 (B.I.A. 1989) ("Where we
[the BIA] disagree with a court's position on a given issue, we decline to follow it outside
the court's circuit. But, we have historically followed a court's precedent in cases arising in
that circuit.").
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framework for the categorical approach in Silva-Trevino, the circuit courts
54
must decide whether to afford it deference.
B. The CategoricalApproach
Whether a particular crime involves moral turpitude is determined
not by the name of the crime in the statute, but rather by the elements of
the crime as defined in the statute. 55 To determine whether a particular
crime is a CIMT, adjudicators have historically employed some form of
the categorical approach, focusing mainly on the "inherent nature" of
the conviction, rather than the particular circumstances of the noncitizen's actions. 56 The categorical approach involves two steps. 57 The first
step, called the traditional categorical approach, 58 considers the criminal
statute of conviction to see if moral turpitude necessarily inheres in the
elements. If the state criminal statute is ambiguous as to whether all convictions under it involve moral turpitude using the first step, courts proceed to the second step, termed the modified categorical approach. 59 At
this second stage in the categorical approach, adjudicators are permitted
to consider the noncitizen's record of conviction to see if it sheds light on
the moral turpitude inquiry. 60 The Supreme Court, the federal circuit
54. See Ali v. Mukasey, 521 F.3d 737, 742-43 (7th Cir. 2008) ("[Prior decisions]
require reexamination [if the Department ofJustice] has fully developed its own position,
for administrative discretion belongs to the agency rather than to the court." (citing Nat'l
Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005))); infra notes
111-112 and accompanying text (describing Attorney General's rationale for giving SilvaTrevino deference). But see infra notes 173-175 and accompanying text (providing Third
Circuit's rationale for not deferring to Silva-Trevino approach).
55. See Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 590-93 (1990) (stating states' labels for
"burglary" do not control in federal sentencing enhancement context); United States ex
rel. Valenti v. Karmuth, 1 F. Supp. 370, 375-76 (N.D.N.Y. 1932) ("[T]he question of moral
turpitude is not determined by the name of the crime, but by the nature of the crime as
defined in the statute and alleged in the indictment."); see also Sharpless, supra note 56, at
993 (" [W] hen determining whether a particular crime falls within a ground of deportation
or inadmissibility[,] . . . [s]tate definitions and labels do not control.").
56. See R-, 6 I. & N. Dec. 444, 447-48 (B.I.A. 1954) ("The test requires us
without regard to the act committed by the alien, to decide whether that law inherently
involves moral turpitude . . . ."). In 1994, the BIA first used the term "categorical
approach" in Alcantar, 20 I. & N. Dec. 801, 809 (B.I.A. 1994). See Rebecca Sharpless,
Toward a True Elements Test: Taylor and the Categorical Analysis of Crimes in
Immigration Law, 62 U. Miami L. Rev. 979, 1000 n.70 (2008) ("The first use of the term
'categorical approach' by the BIA appears to be in Matter of Alcantar." (citation omitted)).
57. But see Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 699 (creating novel third step for
categorical approach for CIMTs); infra notes 118-119 and accompanying text (describing
Silva-Trevino's third step).
58. "Traditional categorical approach" is a term of art in the CIMT context that refers
to the first step of the categorical approach.
59. "Modified categorical approach" is a term of art in the CIMT context that refers to
the second step of the categorical approach.
60. See Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602 (permitting use of record of conviction for modified
categorical approach). A criminal statute can be ambiguous when, for example, it is
"divisible" and some convictions under the statute involve moral turpitude whereas others
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courts, and the BIA all apply some variation of the categorical approach
61
to determine whether a crime involves moral turpitude.
The courts and the BIA have advanced efficiency and consistency
rationales for using the two-step categorical approach. The categorical
approach was developed as a federal standard to ensure that state law
62
determinations of crimes did not control in the immigration context.
The BIA stated:
The rule set forth exists because a standard must be supplied to
administrative agencies; it eliminates the burden of going into
the evidence in a case; it eliminates the situation where a nonjudicial agency retries a judicial matter; and it prevents the situation occurring where two people convicted under the same specific law are given different treatment because one indictment
may contain a fuller or different description of the same act
than the other
indictment; and makes for uniform administra63
tion of law.
1. The First Step: The TraditionalCategoricalApproach. - The first step
in the analysis, referred to as the traditional categorical approach, considers whether the offenses defined under the criminal statute in question
"necessarily" involve moral turpitude by considering the elements of conviction. 64 That is, if every conviction under the criminal statute involves
do not. See Sharpless, supra note 56, at 997-99 (providing definition and various
examples of "divisible" statutes); infra note 77 (discussing second step of categorical
approach for divisible statutes).
61. Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 688; Brief for Am. Immigr. Lawyers Ass'n et al. as
Amici Curiae in Support of Reconsideration at 13-15, Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. 687
(No. A013 014 303) (listing cases from Supreme Court, each circuit, and BIA to
demonstrate that all follow some version or combination of traditional categorical
approach and modified categorical approach for immigration cases).
Although all of the federal circuits follow the traditional categorical and modified
categorical approaches in the immigration context, the Fourth and Tenth Circuits have
not explicitly adopted this method for analyzing CIMTs. See id. at 14-15 (listing circuits
that have applied traditional categorical approach and modified categorical approach for
determining whether conviction is for CIMT: First, Second, Third, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh,
Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh).
62. See Nehme v. INS, 252 F.3d 415, 429 (5th Cir. 2001) ("To avoid leaving the
requirements for citizenship to state control, the court devised a federal standard to
determine whether the petitioner had committed acts constituting a crime of moral
turpitude.").
63. R-, 6 I. & N. Dec. 444, 448 n.2 (B.I.A. 1954) (citation omitted).
64. This traditional categorical approach was established in Taylor, 495 U.S. at 600-02.
Although Taylor dealt primarily with the sentencing enhancement for violent felonies, the
Supreme Court explicitly imported the categorical approach into the immigration context
in Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183, 185-87 (2007), to determine whether a
conviction was a theft offense and thus an aggravated felony. The categorical approach is
now also used for crimes of violence and CIMTs in the immigration arena. See, e.g.,
United States v. Diaz-Ibarra, 522 F.3d 343, 348 (4th Cir. 2008) (using Taylor's categorical
approach to determine if conviction is for crime of violence); Navarro-Lopez v. Gonzales,
503 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2007) (using Taylor framework to determine if conviction
involved moral turpitude); see also Sharpless, supra note 56, at 1008 n.124 (describing
application of Taylor's categorical approach in CIMT context).
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turpitudinous conduct, then a noncitizen's conviction would necessarily
involve moral turpitude, and would thus be for a CIMT. 65 Therefore, if
convictions under the statute only encompass acts that involve moral turpitude, then a convicted noncitizen would face immigration penalties
under the moral turpitude provisions of the INA.
The majority of the circuits use one of two tests for the first step of
the categorical approach to determine if a criminal statute necessarily
involves moral turpitude: the least culpable conduct test or the realistic
probability test.66 The tests differ in how they analyze the criminal statute

of conviction. The least culpable conduct test considers whether moral
turpitude would inhere in the minimum conduct sufficient to satisfy the
elements of the offense. The realistic probability test, on the other hand,
considers if moral turpitude inheres in those acts that would realistically
be prosecuted under the statute.
The Second, Third, and Fifth Circuits use the least culpable conduct
test for the first step in the categorical approach. The Eleventh Circuit
may also use this approach. 67 Under this test, the criminal statute is read
Even before Taylor used the term categorical approach, the federal courts had been
using a comparable approach to determine whether a conviction was one that involved
moral turpitude. United States ex rel. Mylius v. Uhl, 210 F. 860, 862 (2d Cir. 1914)
(framing question for determining if crime involved moral turpitude by asking if it
"necessarily involve[s] moral turpitude").
65. But see infra text accompanying notes 66-76 (describing two main variations in
first step of categorical approach: one variation looks at all possible convictions under
criminal statute, whereas other considers only conduct that has actually been prosecuted
using criminal statute).
66. A third variation that is less frequently used is the ordinary or common case
approach adopted from James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 208 (2007). This approach,
developed in the "violent felony" context for the Armed Career Criminal Act, focuses on
the "the conduct encompassed by the elements of the offense, in the ordinary case." Id.
James states that although one can imagine a hypothetical situation at the margins where a
typically violent crime may not present a real risk or injury, it does not mean that the
offense is not categorically violent. Id. As an example, James cites an attempted murder
where the gun in fact had no bullets, unbeknownst to the person wielding it. This
particular circumstance is still attempted murder, even though it does not present a
genuine risk of injury. Id. Even though it can encompass a situation with no risk of injury,
under the James common case approach, attempted murder is categorically violent,
because it, "by its nature, presents a serious potential risk of injury to another." Id. at
208-09.
Although James involves determining which crimes constitute crimes of violence, it
seems like the Sixth Circuit has borrowed this approach for CIMTs. Although the Sixth
Circuit cites the realistic probability test by name, its description of the test seems to more
closely resembleJames's common case approach. See Serrato-Soto v. Holder, 570 F.3d 686,
690 (6th Cir. 2009) (holding that noncitizen "was convicted of a crime that, in the ordinary
case, involves dishonesty as an essential element" (emphasis added)).
67. Some circuits refer to this test as the minimum conduct approach. Although the
circuits use different names, the approaches are essentially the same. See, e.g., Mendez v.
Mukasey, 547 F.3d 345, 348 (2d Cir. 2008) ("Under the categorical approach, we look only
to the minimum criminal conduct necessary to satisfy the essential elements of the crime,
not the particular circumstances of the defendant's conduct."); Amouzadeh v. Winfrey,
467 F.3d 451, 455 (5th Cir. 2006) ("Under the categorical approach, we read the statute at
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"at its minimum, taking into account 'the minimum criminal conduct
necessary to sustain a conviction under the statute." 68 Every situation
that could violate the criminal statute of conviction must involve moral
turpitude for the statute to categorically involve moral turpitude. If the
least culpable conduct that can sustain a conviction under the criminal
statute does not necessarily involve moral turpitude, then the statute does
not categorically involve moral turpitude. 69 If the least culpable conduct
does involve moral turpitude, then the conviction in question, and any
conviction under the statute, is for a CIMT. "[P]roof of actual application of the statute of conviction to the [minimum criminal] conduct asserted is unnecessary;" a purely hypothetical fact pattern that could sustain a conviction under the statute is sufficient. 70 Inquiry into the actual
71
conduct of the noncitizen is not permitted.
A different version of the first step of the categorical approach uses
the "realistic probability" test, established by the Supreme Court in
Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez in the context of aggravated felonies. 72 Under
the realistic probability test, adjudicators consider whether there is a "realistic probability," not just a hypothetical possibility, that the criminal
statute in question could be applied to conduct that does not involve
its minimum, taking into account 'the minimum criminal conduct necessary to sustain a
conviction under the statute.' An offense is a crime involving moral turpitude if the
minimum reading of the statute necessarily reaches only offenses involving moral
turpitude." (quoting Hamdan v. INS, 98 F.3d 183, 189 (5th Cir. 1996))); Partyka v. Att'y
Gen., 417 F.3d 408, 411 (3d Cir. 2005) ("Under this categorical approach, we read the
applicable statute to ascertain the least culpable conduct necessary to sustain a conviction
under the statute."). The Eleventh Circuit has conflicting precedent, but may use the least
culpable conduct test. See Keungne v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 561 F.3d 1281, 1284 n.3 (lth Cir.
2009) ("In the [first step of the] categorical approach, we analyze whether the least
culpable conduct necessary to sustain a conviction under the statute meets the standard of
a crime involving moral turpitude."). But see infra notes 146-147 and accompanying text
(describing inconsistency in Eleventh Circuit's first step of the categorical approach); infra
note 179 (same).
This Note will refer to the test as the "least culpable conduct" test.
68. Amouzadeh, 467 F.3d at 455 (quoting Hamdan, 98 F.3d at 189).
69. For an illustration of the least culpable conduct test applied to a criminal statute,
see infra note 108 and accompanying text (detailing BIA's application of least culpable
conduct test to Texas criminal statute).
70. Jean-Louis v. Att'y Gen., 582 F.3d 462, 471 (3d Cir. 2009).
71. See, e.g., Partyka, 417 F.3d at 411 ("Whether an alien's crime involves moral
turpitude is determined by the criminal statute and the record of conviction, not the
alien's conduct.").
72. 549 U.S. 183, 193 (2007). Several circuits, as well as the Attorney General, have
adopted the realistic probability test from Duenas-Alvarez for CIMTs. See infra note 114
and accompanying text (describing Attorney General's adoption of realistic probability test
in Silva-Trevino); see also infra Part II.B.I.a (listing circuits that follow realistic probability
test for first step of categorical approach). However, some circuits have not imported this
test into the CIMT context. See supra note 67 and accompanying text (listing circuits that
use least culpable conduct test for CIMTs); see also infra text accompanying notes 169-172
(describing Third Circuit's rationale for rejecting realistic probability test in favor of least
culpable conduct test).
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moral turpitude. 73 Adjudicators focus on the actual scope of the statute
of conviction by asking whether any actual case exists where the criminal
statute was applied to conduct that was not turpitudinous. A noncitizen
must provide evidence of an actual case where the statute in question was
used to prosecute conduct not involving moral turpitude.7 4 Acceptable
forms of evidence are published decisions, unpublished decisions, and
75
plea transcripts, including those from a noncitizen's own criminal case.
73. Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. 687, 689-90 (Op. Att'y Gen. 2008) ("[I]n evaluating
whether an alien's prior offense is one that categorically involves moral turpitude,
immigration judges must determine whether there is a realistic probability, not a
theoretical possibility, that the State or Federal criminal statute pursuant to which the alien
was convicted would be applied to reach conduct that does not involve moral turpitude."
(internal quotation omitted)).
74. Id. In practice, there are slightly different versions of the realistic probability test.
Compare United States v. Grisel, 488 F.3d 844, 850 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc), with United
States v. Ramos-Sanchez, 483 F.3d 400, 402-04 (5th Cir. 2007). The Ninth Circuit's view is
that the realistic probability test does not apply to offenses that are described by the plain
language of a criminal statute. Grisel, 488 F.3d at 850 (holding parties are not required to
show realistic probability of prosecution when "a state statute explicitly defines a crime
more broadly than the generic definition"). In other words, "where divisibility is due to
express statutory language, courts presume that the state will prosecute all of the multiple
offenses contained in the statute." Sharpless, supra note 56, at 1005 n.109. On the other
hand, when the elements of a criminal statute are more ambiguous and can be satisfied by
a range of conduct, the realistic probability test plays a role in determining if some of those
actions would actually be prosecuted under the statute. Although Grisel arose in the
Armed Career Criminal Act "violent felony" context, the realistic probability test it
articulates is the Duenas-Alvarez test, which is also used for CIMTs. Grisel, 488 F.3d at 850
("Where, as here, a state statute explicitly defines a crime more broadly than the generic
definition, no 'legal imagination,' . . . is required to hold that a realistic probability exists
that the state will apply its statute to conduct that falls outside the generic definition of the
crime." (citing Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. at 193)).
Although not used for CIMTs, the Fifth Circuit's realistic probability test for
ascertaining whether a conviction is for a crime of violence for sentencing enhancement
purposes requires actual evidence of realistic probability, regardless of the wording of the
statute. See Ramos-Sanchez, 483 F.3d at 404. In Ramos-Sanchez, the Fifth Circuit held that a
noncitizen must prove that statutory rape involving consensual sex had actually been
prosecuted under the statute to satisfy the realistic probability test. Id.
75. Nat'l Lawyers Guild, supra note 32, § 6:3. However, because Duenas-Alvarez does
not explicitly state which documents may be used as evidence, the realistic probability test
presents some ambiguity. See Nicanor-Romero v. Mukasey, 523 F.3d 992, 1005 (9th Cir.
2008), overruled on other grounds by Marmolejo-Campos v. Holder, 558 F.3d 903 (9th Cir.
2009) ("[T]he [Duenas-Alvarez] opinion fails to specify what type of evidence may be used
to satisfy the 'realistic probability' requirement."). For a discussion of the ambiguity
regarding who bears the burden of "demonstrating a 'realistic probability' that conduct
reached by a statute falls within the scope of a" CIMT under the test created by DuenasAlvarez, see id. at 1004-05.
If a noncitizen uses her own case to demonstrate that the criminal statute has been
applied to conduct that does not involve moral turpitude, the court must determine
whether her actions involved moral turpitude, arguably going beyond a categorical
approach. Although the categorical approach generally forbids inquiry into the facts
underlying a conviction, the realistic probability test would permit such an inquiry under
these circumstances.
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If the criminal statute, in practice, has not been applied to nonturpitudinous conduct, the adjudicator's inquiry ends with a determination
that all convictions under the statute are for CIMTs, and that the nonci76
tizen's conviction is thus for a CIMT.
2. The Second Step: The Modified CategoricalApproach. - If the first
step of the categorical approach is unable to elucidate whether the criminal statute at issue involves moral turpitude, the adjudicator moves to the
77
second step-the modified categorical approach.
Under the modified categorical approach, adjudicators are authorized to consult the noncitizen's record of conviction to determine, at a
minimum, under which portion of the statute she was convicted to ascertain whether convictions under that portion necessarily involve moral turpitude. 78 The record of conviction consists of, inter alia, the charging
76. Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 697 ("If the statute has not been.., applied in any
case (including the alien's own case) [to conduct that does not involve moral turpitude],
the adjudicator can reasonably conclude that all convictions under the statute may
categorically be treated as ones involving moral turpitude.").
77. The posture for reaching the modified categorical approach will be different
depending on which test the adjudicator uses for the traditional categorical approach.
Rather than viewing it as a second step, some courts-generally those that use the least
culpable conduct test for the first step of the categorical approach-have referred to the
second step as "[a]n exception to [the categorical approach] ... if the statute is divisible
into discrete subsections of acts that are and those that are not CIMTs." Hamdan v. INS,
98 F.3d 183, 187 (5th Cir. 1996); see also Jean-Louis v. Att'y Gen., 582 F.3d 462, 466 (3d
Cir. 2009) ("Where a statute of conviction contains disjunctive elements, some of which are
sufficient for conviction of the . . . offense and others of which are not, we have departed
from a strict categorical approach."); Amouzadeh v. Winfrey, 467 F.3d 451, 455 (5th Cir.
2006) ("If the statute is divisible, 'we look at the alien's record of conviction to determine
whether he has been convicted of a subsection that qualifies as a [CIMT].'" (quoting
Smalley v. Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 332, 336 (5th Cir. 2003))).
For courts that use the realistic probability test, however, the modified categorical
approach is treated more like a second step in the CIMT inquiry, and is used when the first
step, the traditional categorical approach, is inconclusive. See Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec.
at 708 (treating modified categorical approach as second step in CIMT inquiry).
The modified categorical approach is used when crimes that both do and do not
involve moral turpitude can realistically be prosecuted under the criminal statute as a
result of broad statutory language. Additionally, like with adjudicators who use the least
culpable conduct test, those using the realistic probability test will proceed to the modified
categorical approach when a statute is divisible.
78. See, e.g., Kellermann v. Holder, 592 F.3d 700, 703 (6th Cir. 2010) ("[Wle must
first examine the statute itself to determine whether the inherent nature of the crime
involves moral turpitude. If the statute defines a crime in which moral turpitude
necessarily inheres, then the conviction is for a [CIMT] . . . and our analysis ends.
However, if the statute contains some offenses which involve moral turpitude and others
which do not, it is... a 'divisible' statute, and we look to the record of conviction .
(quoting Ajami, 22 I. & N. Dec. 949, 950 (B.I.A. 1999)) (citations omitted)).
A divisible statute is one that has multiple sections or uses disjunctive language to
define multiple offenses. The sections or language can be separated and each be made
into stand-alone statutes with its own elements. See T-, 2 I. & N. Dec. 22, 23 (B.I.A. 1944)
("If one statute defines several crimes, some of which involve moral turpitude and some of
which do not, and the statute is divisible, it is permissible to ascertain by examination of
the record of conviction whether the particular offense involved moral turpitude.");
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document, a written plea agreement, a verdict orjudgment of conviction,
a record of the sentence, a plea colloquy transcript, and any explicit factual finding by a trial judge or a jury.79 Adjudicators are not permitted,
however, to consider facts underlying the noncitizen's conviction that are
extrinsic to the record of conviction.8 0 If the record of conviction demonstrates that the particular offense for which the noncitizen was convicted involves moral turpitude, then the noncitizen's conviction is for a
CIMT.8 1 If the record of conviction is ambiguous, however, the categorical inquiry ends, and an adjudicator cannot conclude that the noncitizen
was convicted of a CIMT.
Sharpless, supra note 56, at 996 ("A divisible statute is one that can be broken down and
rewritten into multiple statutes, each with its own set of elements."). For an illustration of
the modified categorical approach, both using an abstract example and an example
involving driving with a suspended license, see id. at 997-98. A statute does not need to be
formally divided into subsections; "[r]ather, the key is whether the provision is disjunctive
in a relevant sense" in that a statute may be broad enough to encompass conduct that does
and does not involve moral turpitude. Garcia v. Att'y Gen., 462 F.3d 287, 293 n.9 (3d Cir.
2006). Although Garcia dealt with aggravated felonies, Jean-Louis affirmed that this
approach is also applicable in the CIMT context. See Jean-Louis, 582 F.3d at 466 (applying
modified categorical approach from Garcia"when clear sectional divisions do not delineate
the statutory variations").
If a statute is divisible, it may be difficult to ascertain what would be the least culpable
conduct punishable under it. An adjudicator would thus need additional information
regarding the noncitizen's conviction to determine under which subsection of the statute
she was convicted in order to ascertain whether a conviction under that portion of the
statute necessarily involves moral turpitude. In such an instance, the court would proceed
to the modified categorical approach to determine under which subsection the noncitizen
was convicted.
Some courts, however, allow the factfinder to consider the record of conviction for
purposes other than simply ascertaining under which portion of the statute the noncitizen
was convicted. See infra notes 86-90 and accompanying text (describing broader inquiry
permitted by BIA, First Circuit, and Seventh Circuit).
79. Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 26 (2005) (permitting use of not only
"charging document" but also "terms of a plea agreement," "transcript of colloquy between
judge and defendant," or "some comparable judicial record" regarding "factual basis for
the plea" in nonjury cases); Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 602 (1990) (permitting
use of, for example, "the indictment or information and jury instructions"); see also Wala
v. Mukasey, 511 F.3d 102, 108 (2d Cir. 2007) ("The record of conviction includes, inter
alia, the charging document, a plea agreement, a verdict or judgment of conviction, a
record of the sentence, or a plea colloquy transcript." (internal quotation omitted)).
80. See Sweetser, 22 I. & N. Dec. 709, 714 (B.I.A. 1999) ("Where a statute under
which an alien was convicted is divisible, we look to the record of conviction .... This
approach does not involve an inquiry into facts previously presented and tried. Instead the
focus is on the elements required to sustain the conviction."). Although Sweetser is an
aggravated felony case, the fact that the modified categorical approach is limited to the
record of conviction is the same for CIMT cases. See Jean-Louis, 582 F.3d at 472 ("[W]e
review[ ] only the record of the conviction to ascertain the particular variation of the
statute under which the defendant was convicted.").
81. See, e.g., Kellerman, 592 F.3d at 704 (stating under modified categorical approach,
"the court conducts a limited examination of documents in the record [of conviction] to
determine whether the particular offense for which the alien was convicted constitutes a
CIMT").
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In practice, there are two versions of the second step used by the BIA
and the federal circuits that differ in the scope of their consideration of
the record of conviction. The majority approach uses the record of conviction only for a narrow purpose: to ascertain under what portion of the
statute the noncitizen was convicted, in order to determine if those elements necessarily involve moral turpitude. 82 The most basic example is a
divisible statute, where an adjudicator consults the record of conviction
to determine under which subsection the noncitizen was convicted. Another example is in the burglary context where not all of the acts encompassed by a burglary statute necessarily involve moral turpitude, with the
inquiry often turning on the underlying crime the noncitizen intended to
commit upon entry.8 3 In such a situation, the factfinder may be permitted to proceed to the second step to determine whether the noncitizen
pleaded guilty to or the factfinder found elements constituting a CIMT
s4
for the crime she intended to commit after entering.
The First and Seventh Circuits, and occasionally the BIA in practice,8 5 permit broader use of the record of conviction because the elements of a CIMT may not necessarily be elements for conviction under

82. See, e.g., Fernandez-Ruiz v. Gonzales, 468 F.3d 1159, 1169 (9th Cir. 2006)
(articulating that record of conviction should be used to see if noncitizen "'pled guilty to
elements that constitute a [CIMT]"' (quoting Cuevas-Gaspar v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 1013,
1020 (9th Cir. 2005))); Vargas v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 451 F.3d 1105, 1109 (10th Cir.
2006) (describing Taylor's modified categorical approach as inquiry into whether jury had
to find elements of underlying offense that would constitute CIMT); see also Sharpless,
supra note 56, at 1006-08 (describing courts' application of narrow categorical approach).
83. Under Washington law, for example, a person can be found guilty of burglary if
he "enters or remains unlawfully in a dwelling" with an "intent to commit a crime." CuevasGaspar, 430 F.3d at 1019 (quoting Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.52.025(1) (2009)). The CuevasGasparcourt stated that the act of entering is not itself "base, vile or depraved," but that the
particular crime that the noncitizen intends to commit after entering is what determines
whether the burglary offense involves moral turpitude. Id. (quoting M., 2 I. & N. Dec. 721,
723 (B.I.A. 1946)). When considering whether a burglary is a CIMT, the court provided
the following example to show that not all of the actions encompassed by the burglary
statute would necessarily involve moral turpitude:
[A] group of boys opening the unlocked door of an abandoned barn with the
intention of playing cards in violation of one of the many New York wagering
laws, could all be convicted of third degree burglary. Yet, we do not think that
such persons should be deemed to be base, vile or depraved.
Id. (quoting M., 2 I. & N. Dec. at 723).
84. Cuevas-Gaspar,430 F.3d at 1020-21 (stating under modified categorical approach,
court must "determine whether the record of conviction shows that [the noncitizen] pled
guilty to elements that constitute a [CIMT]"). The noncitizen admitted in his signed plea
statement that "[he] helped another person take property without permission from a
residence where no one was home." Id. at 1020. Using the guilty plea, the court
concluded that his conviction was a CIMT using the modified categorical approach. Id. at
1020-21.
85. The BIA generally applies the law of the circuit in which the case arises. See supra
notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
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the criminal statute. 86 The First and Seventh Circuits have stated that the
Taylor v. United States87 categorical framework, originally designed for the
criminal sentencing context, 88 need not be transplanted exactly into the
civil removal context. 89 Consequently, the government need not demonstrate that "the jury in the prior criminal case necessarily found (or,
where a guilty plea has taken place, that the defendant necessarily admitted) every element of an offense" that triggers removal; it is sufficient that
these facts, demonstrating that the conviction involved moral turpitude,
are in the record of conviction. 90
II.

MAT'rER OF SILvA-TPEVINo AND

DISCORD

ACROSS THE CIRCUITS

The Attorney General proposed a new approach for determining
whether a conviction is one that involves moral turpitude in Matter of
Silva-Trevino.91 He explicitly adopted the realistic probability test for the
first step of the categorical approach and added a third step that permits
factfinders to consider evidence extrinsic to the record of conviction,
changing the customary two-step categorical approach. 92 Since SilvaTrevino, circuits have remained split over the use of the realistic
probability test or the least culpable conduct test for the first step of the
86. For example, many burglary statutes do not require a finding that there has been
a permanent taking to sustain a conviction. In Grazley, 14 I. & N. Dec. 330 (B.I.A. 1973),
the statute of conviction criminalized both temporary and permanent takings. However, in
order for burglary to be a CIMT, the taking must be permanent. Id. at 333. Even though
the charged offense was not explicitly a permanent taking, the BIA, using the modified
categorical approach, inferred that the taking was permanent because the stolen property
was cash. Id. The BIA thus strayed from using the record of conviction solely for the
purpose of determining the prior crime committed; instead, it used the record to assess
the underlying conduct even though it was not a necessary element in the criminal
conviction. See Sharpless, supra note 56, at 1009 (providing examples in which "[t]he BIA
has strayed from the majority, elements approach when analyzing whether particular theft
offenses constitute crimes involving moral turpitude").
87. 495 U.S. 575 (1990).
88. See supra note 64 (describing Taylor's development of categorical approach in
federal sentencing context).
89. Ali v. Mukasey, 521 F.3d 737, 741 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding protections from Taylor
and Shepard, which are sentencing enhancement cases, that "prevent[ ] the sentencing
judge ... from assuming a role that the Constitution assigns to the jurors" are not present
in immigration proceedings because they "are not criminal prosecutions"); Conteh v.
Gonzales, 461 F.3d 45, 55-56 (1st Cir. 2006) ("[W]e .. .see no warrant for applying an
exact replica of the Taylor-Shepard categorical approach in the immigration context."); see
also Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 729-30 (1893) (holding constitutional
protections afforded criminal defendants are not applicable to noncitizens in deportation
proceedings because deportation is not itself punishment for a crime). Although Conteh is
an aggravated felony case, its reasoning that a removal proceeding is not a criminal
proceeding carries over for removal based on a conviction for a CIMT.
90. Conteh, 461 F.3d at 55.
91. 24 I. & N. Dec. 687 (Op. Att'y Gen. 2008).
92. Id. at 688-90.
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categorical approach. 9 3 At present, only the Seventh Circuit uses the
third step of Silva-Trevino.94 Both the Third 95 and Eighth Circuits9 6 have
refused to apply the Silva-Trevino approach in its entirety.
A. The Attorney General's New Framework in Silva-Trevino
Silva-Trevino dramatically changed the analysis to determine whether
a criminal conviction is for a CIMT for the purpose of removal decisions.
The Attorney General announced a novel three-step framework in SilvaTrevino for making this determination in response to the "patchwork of
different approaches" across the federal circuit courts, which was leading
to inconsistent results when courts identified whether a conviction was
97
for a CIMT.
1. Background of the Case. - Cristoval Silva-Trevino was a citizen of
Mexico who was admitted to the United States as an LPR in 1962. On
October 6, 2004, he pled nolo contendere to the Texas criminal offense
of "indecency with a child. '98 The Texas state court accepted SilvaTrevino's plea and fined him $250, placed him under community supervision for five years, and directed him to participate in sex offender
counseling. 99
The Department of Homeland Security subsequently initiated removal proceedings against Silva-Trevino based on his conviction for an
aggravated felony. 10 0 The IJ ruled that Silva-Trevino's conviction for "sex93. See supra note 67 (listing circuits that use least culpable conduct test); infra Part
II.B.1.a (detailing circuits that use realistic probability test).
94. Mata-Guerrero v. Holder, 627 F.3d 256, 260 (7th Cir. 2010) ("We defer to the
Attorney General's decision in Silva-Trevino.").
95. Jean-Louis v. Att'y Gen., 582 F.3d 462, 470 (3d Cir. 2009) ("We conclude that
deference is not owed to Silva-Trevino's novel approach and thus will apply our established
methodology.").
96. Guardado-Garcia v. Holder, 615 F.3d 900, 902 (8th Cir. 2010) (declining to follow
Silva-Trevino to extent "inconsistent" with circuit precedent).
97. Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 688-89; see also supra note 39 and accompanying
text (describing Attorney General's authority to review BIA cases).
98. Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 690 (citing Silva-Trevino, A13 014 303, at 1 (B.I.A.
Aug. 8, 2006); Silva-Trevino, A13 014 303, at 3 (Oral Dec. of Immigr. Judge (1J) Feb. 9,
2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The offense of "Indecency With a Child," Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 21.11 (West 2003)
(amended 2009), criminalizes "sexual contact" with any individual under seventeen years
of age who is not the person's spouse, unless the person is "not more than three years
older than the victim and of the opposite sex." The statute defines "sexual contact" as "any
touching by a person, including touching through clothing, of the anus, breast, or any part
of the genitals of a child" or "any touching of any part of the body of a child, including
through clothing, with the anus, breast, or any part of the genitals of a person" if
"committed with the intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person." Id.
§ 21.11(c).
99. Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 690-91 (citing Silva-Trevino, A13 014 303, at 3-4

(U)).

100. See INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2006) ("Any alien
who is convicted of an aggravated felony at any time after admission is deportable.").
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ual abuse of a minor" was an aggravated felony, which rendered him removable under the INA. 10 1 Silva-Trevino subsequently sought to adjust
his status to re-obtain LPR status to avoid removal. 10 2 He contended that
the grounds for inadmissibility in section 212(a) (2) of the INA, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a) (2), which includes conviction for CIMTs, did not bar his adjustment of status. 10 3 Silva-Trevino argued that:
[The] State conviction should not be considered a conviction
for a [CIMT] because (1) both the [BIA] and the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit focus on whether the entire category of offenses covered by a State criminal statute involves moral turpitude; and (2) the Texas statute under which
he was convicted does not require "that a person have knowledge that the individual with whom the perpetrator has sexual
contact is a child" and thus permits convictions in cases that do
not involve moral turpitude where the defendant honestly and
reasonably believed his sexual conduct was with a consenting
adult. 104
Nevertheless, the IJ denied the petition for adjustment of status and ordered his removal to Mexico, holding that offenses under the Texas criminal statute categorically were CIMTs because they were "analogous to a
statutory rape offense," which the BIA has held to categorically involve
moral turpitude regardless of whether an element of the crime was that
the defendant knew or should have known the victim's age. 10 5 As a result, Silva-Trevino was ineligible for the discretionary relief of adjustment
of status.

10 6

101. Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 691 (citing Silva-Trevino, A13 014 303, at 5-6
(1J)). Aggravated felonies are defined in section 101(a)(43) of the INA, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101 (a) (43).
102. Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 691 (citing Silva-Trevino, A13 014 303, at 9-12
(IJ)). An LPR who falls under a ground for removal can adjust her status to re-obtain LPR
status under section 245(a) of the INA, 8 U.S.C § 1255(a) to obtain relief from removal.
However, she must meet the requirements set forth in this section, the most difficult being
a showing of admissibility.
Silva-Trevino was ineligible for cancellation of removal and adjustment of status under
section 240A(a) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a), the more widely used provision to obtain
relief from removal for LPRs, because the statute excludes relief for noncitizens convicted
of aggravated felonies. See supra text accompanying note 101 (classifying Silva-Trevino's
conviction for sexual abuse of minor as aggravated felony).
103. Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 691.
104. Id. (citing Silva-Trevino, A13 014 303, at 9 (IJ) (citing Tex. Penal Code Ann.
§ 21.11 (West 2003) (amended 2009))). Silva-Trevino's argument was consistent with Fifth
Circuit precedent, which used the least culpable conduct test for the first step of the
categorical approach. See, e.g., Amouzadeh v. Winfrey, 467 F.3d 451, 455 (5th Cir. 2006)
("Under the categorical approach, we read the statute at its minimum, taking into account
the minimum criminal conduct necessary to sustain a conviction under the statute."
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
105. Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 691 (quoting Silva-Trevino, A13 014 303, at 9-10
(1J)); see also Torres-Varela, 23 I. & N. Dec. 78, 84 (B.I.A. 2001) (arguing statutory rape
involves moral turpitude even though it does not require intent).
106. Silva-Trevino, 24 1. & N. Dec. at 691 (citing Silva-Trevino, A13 014 303, at 12 (IJ)).
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Silva-Trevino appealed to the BIA, which reversed the IJ's determination and held that Fifth Circuit law, which directs adjudicators to "consider the minimum circumstances possible for a conviction," must be followed. 10 7 Because not every possible conviction under the Texas statute
involved turpitudinous conduct, the BIA held that Silva-Trevino's conviction should not categorically be considered to involve moral turpitude,
10 8
regardless of the actual circumstances surrounding his conviction.
The BIA vacated the IJ's decision and remanded the case.
While the remand was pending before the IJ, Attorney General
Alberto Gonzales directed the BIA to refer the Matter of Silva-Trevino to
him sua sponte on July 10, 2007.109 On November 7, 2008, Attorney
General Michael Mukasey issued an opinion that reversed the BIA's deci107. Id. at 692 (quoting Silva-Trevino, A13 014 303, at 3-4 (B.I.A. Aug. 8, 2006)
(citing Rodriguez-Castro v. Gonzales, 427 F.3d 316, 320 (5th Cir. 2005))).
108. Id. (citing Silva-Trevino, A13 014 303, at 4 (B.I.A.)). The BIA concluded:
In contrast to statutory rape, . . . which typically involves penetration or
something similar, the sexual conduct encompassed by [Texas Penal Code]
§ 21.11(a)(1) potentially involves much less intrusive contact. For example, a
defendant in Texas has been convicted under the statute for touching the chest/
breast of a 10-year-old boy. See Sullivan v. State, 986 S.W.2d 708 (Tex. Crim. App.
1999). This raises the possibility that a 20-year-old woman dancing suggestively
with a youth just under the age of 17, who represents himself as older and can
reasonably be believed to be such, could be liable under the statute if she acted
on a desire to arouse herself or a spectator. This is so even if she touched the
victim through his clothing. This does not strike us as the type of behavior which
would be classified as involving moral turpitude under the [INA].
Id. (quoting Silva-Trevino, A13 014 303, at 3-4 (B.I.A.) (footnote omitted)).
109. Id. at 687. Under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(h) (1) (i) (2007), the Attorney General has
the authority to direct the BIA to refer a matter to him to review the BIA's decision. See
supra note 40 and accompanying text (discussing Attorney General's authority to review
immigration decisions).
There is some controversy surrounding the Attorney General's referral. Both the
amici and Jean-Louis mention that the circumstances surrounding the Attorney General's
sua sponte certification were not transparent:
Despite requests by Silva-Trevino's counsel, the Attorney General refused to
identify the issues to be considered, to define the scope of his review, to provide a
briefing schedule, or to apprise counsel of the applicable briefing procedure....
[N]either the IJ decision nor the Attorney General's certification order were
made publicly available, thus denying stakeholders, including immigrant and
refugee advocacy organizations, the opportunity to register their views. As a
result, the first opportunity of amici curiae to file comment was after entry of the
Attorney General's opinion.
Jean-Louis v. Att'y Gen., 582 F.3d 462, 470-71 n.11 (3d Cir. 2009); see also Brief for Am.
Immigr. Lawyers Ass'n et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Reconsideration, supra note 61,
at 7-11 (questioning Attorney General's sua sponte certification). A letter from the
Immigrant Rights Clinic at Washington Square Legal Services, the Immigration Justice
Clinic at Cardozo School of Law, and IDEAS Consultation to Attorney General Eric Holder
to withdraw Silva-Trevino also stressed the impropriety of Attorney General Mukasey's
decision. Letter from Alina Das, Immigrant Rights Clinic, Wash. Square Legal Servs., Inc.
et al., to Eric H. Holder, Jr., U.S. Att'y Gen. 3-6 (Feb. 9, 2009), available at http://www.
immigrantdefenseproject.org/docs/2009021OLettertoHolderFINALSIGNED.pdf (on file
with the Columbia Law Review) (arguing Silva-Trevino was "issued without minimal
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sion and outlined a novel three-step inquiry.ll0 The Attorney General
held that the INA and agency deference permitted him to create a uni
form approach to decide whether a particular conviction involved moral
turpitude.111 He also cited Brand X as providing authority to agencies,
not courts, to "fill statutory gaps" in ambiguous statutes.112
2. Silva-Trevino's Three-Step Approach. - The Attorney General m
Silva-Trevino stated:
[In order] to determine whether an alien's prior conviction trig
gers application of the [INA]'s moral turpitude provisions, adju
dicators should: (1) look first to the statute of conviction under
the categorical inquiry set forth in this opinion and recently ap
plied by the Supreme Court in Duenas-Alvarez; (2) if the categor
ical inquiry does not resolve the question, look to the alien's
record of conviction, including documents such as the indict
ment, the judgment of conviction, jury instructions, a signed
guilty plea, and the plea transcript; and (3) if the record of con
viction does not resolve the inquiry, consider any additional evi
dence the adjudicator determines is necessary or appropriate to
resolve accurately the moral turpitude question.ll 3
The Attorney General in Silva-Trevino explicitly adopted the realistic
probability test from Duenas-Alvarez for the first step of the categorical
approach.II4 If realistically prosecuted acts unambiguously either always
or never involve moral turpitude, the factfinder's inquiry ends.
procedures to allow for meaningful participation by Mr. Silva-Trevino's attorney and other
interested parties").
1 IO. Attorney General Gonzales resigned on September 17, 2007. Letter from
Alberto R. Gonzales, Att'y Gen., to President George W. Bush (Aug. 26, 2007), available at
http://wwwJustice.gov/ archive/ag/speeches/2007/ag_resign_letter.pdf (on file with the
Columbia Law Review). Attorney General Michael Mukasey was confirmed by the Senate on
November 8, 2007. Michael B. Mukasey, Att'y Gen., Prepared Remarks at His Installation
Ceremony (Nov. 14, 2007), available at http://wwwJustice.gov/archive/ag/speeches/
2007/ag_speech_071114.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
11 I. Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 688-89. The Attorney General stated that the
INA gives the "Department of Justice-the agency charged with interpreting and
implementing many of its provisions-the authority to craft such an approach." Id. at 688.
The Attorney General held that this authority is derived from section 103(a)(1) of the INA,
8 U.S.C.§ 1103(a)(l) (2006), which provides that the "determination and ruling by the
Attorney General with respect to all questions of law shall be controlling." Silva-Trevino, 24
I. & N. Dec. at 688-89 (quoting INA§ 103(a)(l), 8 U.S.C.§ 1103(a)(l)).
112. Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 689 (quoting Nat'! Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v.
Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982 (2005)); see supra note 46 (describing
deference to agency decisions under Brand X). But see infra note 173 (describing Third
Circuit's position that ambiguity in statute was created by Attorney General himself).
113. Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 704.
114. Id. at 689-90 (citing Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183, 193 (2007)). The
factfinder needs to determine whether there is a "realistic probability, not a theoretical
possibility" that acts actually prosecuted under the criminal statute do not involve moral
turpitude. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. at 193. For a further discussion of the realistic
probability test, see supra notes 72-76 and accompanying text.
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If the answer is ambiguous and crimes that both do and do not involve moral turpitude are realistically prosecuted under the statute, the
analysis continues to the second step, the modified categorical approach.
This step permits a factfinder to consider the record of conviction to see
if these documents shed light on whether the conviction covers conduct
involving moral turpitude. 1 15 The Attorney General's second step in
Silva-Trevino suggests that the record of conviction can be mined for any
facts that could shed light on the circumstances underlying the criminal
conviction.1 16 This view rejects the majority position that the record of
conviction should only be used to determine under which portion of the
117
statute the noncitizen was convicted.
Under the Silva-Trevino approach, the CIMT inquiry proceeds to a
third step if the record of conviction does not clearly indicate whether
the noncitizen was convicted of a CIMT. 118 This novel third step proposed by the Attorney General gives the factfinder considerable discretion by permitting her to consider any other evidence beyond the record
of conviction that she determines is "necessary or appropriate" to resolve
the CIMT question. 119 However, the Attorney General suggested that
this discretion is not unbounded. An adjudicator may not relitigate facts
decided by the criminal court. 120 Furthermore, the third step is limited
121
to the CIMT context.
The Attorney General suggested that the language of the INA permits inquiry into additional evidence beyond what was customarily authorized by the first and second steps of the categorical approach. The
Attorney General's rationale in permitting courts to consider extrinsic
evidence comes primarily from the "ambiguity" in the statutory language
of the INA.122 He argued that the statutory text "cuts in different directions" regarding the method to determine whether particular conduct
involves moral turpitude. 1 23 Although the use of "convicted of' rather
than "committed" in section 212(a) (2) (A) (i) of the INA, 8 U.S.C.
115. Silva-Trevino, 24 1. & N. Dec. at 698-99; see supra Part I.B.2 (describing modified
categorical approach).
116. Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 708 ("[A]n adjudicator should engage in a
modified categorical inquiry, considering whether the facts of the alien's prior conviction
in fact involved moral turpitude." (emphasis added)); see supra notes 82-90 and
accompanying text (describing variations of modified categorical approach).
117. See supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text (discussing majority approach).
118. See Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 708 (noting adjudicator may consider
"additional evidence or factfinding" after reviewing record of conviction).
119. Id.
120. Id. at 704.
121. Id. For example, adjudicators use a version of the categorical approach to
determine whether a conviction is for an aggravated felony for immigration purposes. See
infra notes 181-186 and accompanying text (comparing categorical approach in CIMT
and aggravated felony contexts). The third step would not be applied to the categorical
approach for aggravated felonies.
122. Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 693.
123. Id.
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§ 1182(a) (2) (A) (i), suggests the use of a categorical approach, the
Attorney General stated that other language indicates that inquiry into
the particularized facts of a noncitizen's actions is permitted. He specifically cited "the reference in § 212(a) (2) (A)(i) (I) to aliens who admit
'committing' certain 'acts.' ",124 He also pointed to the use of "involving"
in the term "CIMT." Finally, he concluded that since "moral turpitude is
not an element of an offense," courts should be permitted to consider the
actual facts.' 25 Because the text "contemplate[s] a finding that the particular alien did or did not commit a crime involving moral turpitude
before immigration penalties are or are not applied," he argued that restricting the inquiry to the record of conviction "is hard to square with
126
the text of the [INA]."
3. Application of the Three-Step Approach in Silva-Trevino. - The
Attorney General vacated the BIA's decision that Silva-Trevino's conviction did not involve moral turpitude and remanded the case to be decided consistent with the new approach he outlined in Silva-Trevino. He
applied the first two steps of his new framework in his opinion and remanded the case to the BIA to apply the third step.
Before proceeding to the categorical approach, however, the
Attorney General made a determination that any sexual contact with a
minor, if "the perpetrator knew or should have known that the victim was
a minor," involves moral turpitude.1 27 He reversed the holding of the
BIA that the "severity of the sexual contact" was the determinative factor
for whether a conviction involves moral turpitude, focusing instead on
the age of the victim. 128 The fact that the perpetrator knew or should
124. Id.
125. Id. at 699.
126. Id. The amici curiae, who filed a brief in response to Silva-Trevino and argued
for reconsideration of the decision, are not persuaded by the Attorney General's argument
that the statutory language permits inquiry into facts outside the record of conviction.
Brief for Am. Immigr. Lawyers Ass'n et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, supra
note 61, at 22-24. The amici argue that the Attorney General's reasoning is not persuasive
because language relating to "'admissions,' 'commissions' and 'acts' does not alter the
requirements surrounding 'convictions'" because "where Congress does predicate
immigration consequences on 'convictions,' it seeks to confine courts' review to the
individual's conviction, not his or her conduct or separate admissions." Id. The amici also
cite the use of different requirements when relying on statements of admission by
noncitizens. Id. at 23. The amici discount the Attorney General's argument that the use of
"involving" suggests that an inquiry into extrinsic facts is proper by pointing out that
.crime involving moral turpitude" is a "legal term of art" that has been in use for
approximately a century. The amici suggest that the Attorney General's "dissection" of the
term is nothing more than a "red herring.., contrary to the history of jurisprudence on
the term." Id. at 23-24.
127. Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 705.
128. Id. The BIA concluded that the Texas statute did not categorically involve moral
turpitude because it encompasses sexual contact with minors that is far less intrusive than
rape. Id. The Attorney General, on the other hand, posited that "so long as the
perpetrator knew or should have known that the victim was a minor, any intentional sexual
contact by an adult with a child involves moral turpitude" because "[s]uch contact is
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have known that the victim was a minor supplies the requisite scienter to
be a CIMT. 1 29 In other words, the Attorney General held that intentional
sexual contact with a person that the perpetrator knew or should have
13 0
known was a minor involves moral turpitude.
Next, the Attorney General applied the categorical approach and
considered whether there was a realistic probability that the Texas criminal statute would be applied to reach conduct not involving moral turpitude under the first step, the traditional categorical approach. 131 After
examining prior convictions under the statute, he found that there was a
realistic probability that the statute could be applied to reach nonturpitudinous conduct-where the perpetrator neither knew nor had reason
to know the victim's age.1 32 Therefore, the first step of the categorical
approach did not establish that Silva-Trevino's conviction categorically involved moral turpitude.
The Attorney General then proceeded to the second step of the analysis. He agreed with the BIA's finding that the record of conviction did
not contain any information pertaining to Silva-Trevino's actual conduct.' 33 The BIA had ended its inquiry at this point because under the
categorical approach prior to Silva-Trevino, it was barred from considering evidence extrinsic to the record of conviction. Thus, the Attorney
General remanded the case to the BIA for further consideration consistent with the third step of his new approach to determine whether Silva134
Trevino knew or should have known the victim's age.
The Attorney General then provided suggestions for the application
of the third step to the case at hand. He suggested that simple questioning of Silva-Trevino to see whether he knew or should have known the
victim's age would resolve the inquiry of whether his conduct involved
'inherently base, vile, or depraved, and contrary to the accepted rules of morality and the
duties owed between persons or to society in general.'" Id. (quoting Hamdan v. INS, 98
F.3d 183, 185-86 (5th Cir. 1996)).
129. Id. at 706 ("A finding of moral turpitude under the [INA] requires that a
perpetrator have committed the reprehensible act with some form of scienter."); see also
Michel v. INS, 206 F.3d 253, 263 (2d Cir. 2000) ("[W]here knowledge is a necessary
element of a crime under a particular criminal statute, moral turpitude inheres in. that
crime.").
130. Silva-Trevino, 24 1. & N. Dec. at 707.
131. Id. at 708.
132. Id. In Johnson v. State, the Texas statute was applied to conduct that did not
involve moral turpitude. 967 S.W.2d 848, 849 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (en banc)
(convicting nineteen-year-old of criminal sexual contact with child despite fact he did not
know or have reason to know victim was child because victim and friend told him victim
was seventeen, and because she looked older than her age). A conviction under this
statute would only involve moral turpitude if the perpetrator knew or reasonably should
have known the victim's age. See supra notes 128-130 and accompanying text (describing
further that intentional sexual contact where perpetrator knows or should have known
victim was minor involves moral turpitude).
133. Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 708.
134. Id. at 708-09.
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moral turpitude. 135 Additionally, evidence as to whether Silva-Trevino
and the victim had a prior relationship could be used to establish that he
knew or should have known the victim's age.1 36 The Attorney General's
purpose for making these recommendations was to demonstrate that
3 7
"[t]he inquiry on remand need not be administratively burdensome."'
B. Circuit Approaches after Silva-Trevino
Since the Attorney General promulgated his new approach, the circuits have split on the adoption of the methodology outlined in SilvaTrevino. With regard to the first step, a number of circuits have followed
Silva-Trevino's use of the realistic probability test.' 3 8 Only the Seventh
Circuit follows Silva-Trevino in its entirety. 13 9 The Third and Eighth
Circuits have expressly declined to follow the Attorney General's CIMT
approach.140 The other circuits have not yet confronted the question of
41
whether to adopt Silva-Trevino's three-step approach.
1. Circuits that Follow the Silva-Trevino Approach. - Of the circuits
that have addressed the issue of whether to follow Silva-Trevino, several
have adopted or had already been using the realistic probability test for
the first step of the categorical approach. Only the Seventh Circuit follows the Attorney General's third step, allowing factfinders to consider
14 2
evidence beyond the record of conviction.
a. Circuits that Use the Realistic Probability Test. - The Ninth and
Seventh Circuits, as well as the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits-to a limited
extent-use the realistic probability test as the first step to determine
whether moral turpitude inheres in a particular conviction. The Ninth
Circuit adopted the realistic probability test from Duenas-Alvarez,'14 3 which
was used by the Attorney General in Silva-Trevino. 14 4 The Seventh Circuit
135. Id. at 709.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. See infra Part II.B.L.a (listing circuits that have adopted realistic probability test).
139. Mata-Guerrero v. Holder, 627 F.3d 256, 260 (7th Cir. 2010) ("We defer to the
Attorney General's decision in Silva-Trevino."); Ali v. Mukasey, 521 F.3d 737, 743 (7th Cir.
2008) ("[To determine] whether the crime is one of 'moral turpitude,' the agency has the
discretion to consider evidence beyond the charging papers and judgment of
conviction.").
140. Guardado-Garcia v. Holder, 615 F.3d 900, 902 (8th Cir. 2010);Jean-Louis v. Att'y
Gen., 582 F.3d 462, 470 (3d Cir. 2009).
141. See infra notes 155-161 and accompanying text (discussing circuits that have not
yet considered Silva-Trevino's third step).
142. See infra notes 149-154 and accompanying text (discussing Seventh Circuit's
acceptance of using documents beyond record of conviction for CIMT inquiry).
143. See supra notes 72-75 and accompanying text (discussing realistic probability
test established by Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183, 193 (2007)).
144. See Nunez v. Holder, 594 F.3d 1124, 1129 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Silva-Trevino to
support use of realistic probability test for first step of categorical approach); Castillo-Cruz
v. Holder, 581 F.3d 1154, 1161 & n.9 (9th Cir. 2009) (using realistic probability test from
Duenas-Alvarez to determine whether "there is a 'realistic probability' that [the criminal
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affirmed the three-step Silva-Trevino approach, including the realistic
probability test, in Mata-Guerrero v. Holder.14 5 The Eleventh Circuit
146
adopted the realistic probability test in a recent unpublished decision.
However, a few months prior to that decision, it used the least culpable
conduct test in a precedential decision. 147 Thus, it is unclear which test
the Eleventh Circuit will use in the future. The Sixth Circuit, although
citing the Duenas-Alvarez realistic probability test, may in practice be following a different variation of the first step of the categorical approach,
the common case approach.

14 8

b. Circuits that Follow Silva-Trevino's Third Step. - The Seventh
Circuit is the only circuit that currently permits inquiry beyond the record of conviction to determine whether a conviction involves moral turpitude. Since the Attorney General promulgated his new approach in
Silva-Trevino, the other circuits, aside from the Third and Eighth Circuits,
have not yet addressed whether to apply his novel third step.
The Seventh Circuit, stating that the "Attorney General has abandoned" the categorical approach, explicitly affirmed Silva-Trevino's threestep approach in Mata-Guerrero.149 Mata-Guerrero recognized that even
prior to Silva-Trevino, the Seventh Circuit allowed a factfinder to consider
evidence extrinsic to the record of conviction.' 50 Ali v. Mukasey151 imstatute] has been and will be applied to conduct falling outside of the generic definition of
a crime of moral turpitude").
145. Mata-Guerrero v. Holder, 627 F.3d 256, 260 (7th Cir. 2010) ("First, the
immigration judge should focus on the statute's actual scope and application and ask
whether, at the time of the alien's removal proceeding, any actual (not hypothetical) case
existed in which the statute was applied to conduct that did not involve moral
turpitude ....
).
146. Destin v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 345 F. App'x 485, 487 (11th Cir. 2009) ("[The
categorical] inquiry requires categorical comparison of the elements of the statute of
conviction to the generic definition of moral turpitude and a determination of whether
there is a realistic probability that [the criminal statute] would be applied to conduct that
falls outside the generic definition of a [CIMT]."). Destin is an unpublished decision that
does not have precedential value. l1th Cir. R. 36-2 ("Unpublished opinions are not
considered binding precedent. .. ").
147. Keungne v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 561 F.3d 1281, 1284 n.3 (lth Cir. 2009) ("In the
[first step of the] categorical approach, we analyze whether the least culpable conduct
necessary to sustain a conviction under the statute meets the standard of a crime involving
moral turpitude.").
148. Serrato-Soto v. Holder, 570 F.3d 686, 690 (6th Cir. 2009) (holding noncitizen
was convicted of a crime that, in the ordinary case, involves dishonesty as an essential
element" (emphasis added)); see also supra note 66 (describing common case approach).
Prior to Duenas-Alvarez, the Sixth Circuit used a different approach. See Patel v. Ashcroft,
401 F.3d 400, 409 (6th Cir. 2005) (citing approvingly Second Circuit's use of minimum
criminal conduct test for aggravated felonies).
149. Mata-Guerrero, 627 F.3d at 260 ("We defer to the Attorney General's decision in
Silva-Trevino.").
150. Id. (citing Babaisakov, 24 I. & N. Dec. 306 (B.I.A. 2007), "in which the [BIA]
abandoned the categorical approach and decided that additional evidence could be taken
by the immigration judge when necessary").
151. Ali v. Mukasey, 521 F.3d 737, 743 (7th Cir. 2008).
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ported the idea of using evidence beyond the record of conviction from
In re Babaisakov,152 which held that such evidence could be used to determine the specific fact of whether monetary loss to the victim exceeded
5 3
ten thousand dollars, which is a requirement for an aggravated felony.1
The Seventh Circuit in Ali permitted consultation of the presentence report, which is not part of the record of conviction, to classify the nonci1 54
tizen's offense as one that involves moral turpitude.
Although other circuits have not yet decided whether to adopt the
Attorney General's third step, 155 many circuits seem reluctant to add the
third step to the categorical approach. Even though the Ninth Circuit
has adopted the realistic probability test and the Attorney General's definition of moral turpitude from Silva-Trevino,1 56 the Ninth Circuit's CIMT
inquiry continues to be limited to the record of conviction. 157 The Ninth
152. 24 I. & N. Dec. 306 (B.I.A. 2007). The Third Circuit, however, criticized the
importation of Babaisakov into the CIMT context, stating that it "does not support the farreaching inquiry that the court adopts in Ali." Jean-Louis v. Att'y Gen., 582 F.3d 462, 480
(3d Cir. 2009). The Third Circuit argued that the BIA in Babaisakov considered evidence
outside the record of conviction only for the narrow purpose of seeing if the conviction
met a particular aggravated felony requirement. Id. Because this particular requirement
was not an element of any criminal statute, either federal or state, a pure categorical
approach would have been "unworkable." Id. However, the Third Circuit contends that
"[t]he practical impediments to application of the categorical approach identified in . . .
Babaisakov . . . are not present in the CIMT context," and that adjudicators have been
following a categorical approach for CIMTs for over a century. Id.
153. INA § 101(a)(43)(M)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (43) (M) (i) (2006). The Fifth
Circuit also follows the standard outlined in Babaisakov, but limits it to the aggravated
felony context to determine if monetary loss exceeded ten thousand dollars. ArguellesOlivares v. Mukasey, 526 F.3d 171, 177-80 (5th Cir. 2008) (considering presentence report
to determine whether tax evasion was aggravated felony). The BIA also permits using
evidence beyond the record of conviction in the aggravated felony context to determine
whether an offense is "committed for commercial advantage" under section
101(a)(43)(K)(ii) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(K)(ii). Gertsenshteyn, 24 I. & N.
Dec. 111, 112 (B.I.A. 2007) ("We... conclude ... that whether the offense was 'committed
for commercial advantage' may be proved by any evidence, including evidence outside the
record of conviction.").
154. Ali, 521 F.3d at 742-43 ("[W]e ... conclude that when deciding how to classify
convictions under criteria that go beyond the criminal charge-such as ... whether the
crime is one of 'moral turpitude', the agency has the discretion to consider evidence
beyond the charging papers and judgment of conviction.").
155. See, e.g., Castillo-Torres v. Holder, No. 09-9568, 2010 WL 3529413, at *2 (10th
Cir. Sept. 13, 2010) ("[W]e need not address whether we agree with Silva-Trevino ..
");
Destin v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 345 F. App'x 485, 488 n.2 (11th Cir. 2009) (stating that question
presented was decided by considering first step of categorical approach, and thus not
reaching second and third steps proposed by Silva-Trevino).
156. See Rivera-Delgado v. Holder, 320 F. App'x 567, 568-69 (9th Cir. 2009)
(remanding case to BIA in light of new definition of CIMT in Silva-Trevino); MarmolejoCampos v. Holder, 558 F.3d 903, 915 (9th Cir. 2009) ("[T]he Attorney General has
declared the presence of scienter to be an essential element of a [CIMT]."); see also supra
note 144 and accompanying text (describing use of realistic probability test in Ninth
Circuit).
157. Nicanor-Romero v. Mukasey, 523 F.3d 992, 1007 (9th Cir. 2008) (limiting review
to record of conviction).
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Circuit in Marmolejo-Campos v. Holder explicitly reserved judgment on the
question of considering any additional evidence that is "necessary and
appropriate" 158 because "that question [was] not squarely before [the
court]."159 Ninth Circuit precedent, however, indicates a strong reluctance to consider evidence beyond the record of conviction in removal
proceedings due to fears of inefficiency and of relitigating the underlying
offense.1 60 The Second Circuit may also be unlikely to adopt the third
step of Silva-Trevino because past decisions demonstrate an unwillingness
to expand the CIMT inquiry to include consideration of extrinsic
16 1
evidence.
158. 558 F.3d at 907 n.6 (quoting Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. 687, 699 (Op. Att'y
Gen. 2008)).
159. Id.
160. See Tokatly v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 613, 621 (9th Cir. 2004) ("If we were to allow
evidence that is not part of the record of conviction as proof of whether an alien falls
within the reach of [an INA removal provision], we essentially would be inviting the parties
to present any and all evidence bearing on an alien's conduct leading to the conviction....
Such an endeavor is inconsistent... with the streamlined adjudication that a deportation
hearing is intended to provide .... " (quoting Pichardo, 21 1. & N. Dec. 330, 335 (B.I.A.
1996))). Although the question presented in Tokatly dealt with whether the conviction was
for a crime of domestic violence in the context of a removal proceeding, the court
imported the categorical approach from Taylor. See id. at 615 (holding Taylor "categorical
and modified categorical approach is applicable" to determining whether conviction is for
"crime of domestic violence"). Given the similarity of the categorical approaches for
CIMTs and crimes of violence and the need for administrative efficiency, the Ninth Circuit
may be hesitant to expand inquiry to evidence extrinsic to the record of conviction for
CIMTs.
161. Wala v. Mukasey, 511 F.3d 102, 109-10 (2d Cir. 2007) ("The BIA, by looking to
the facts of Wala's conviction to infer such an intent [for a permanent taking], therefore
transgressed the permitted scope of the modified categorical approach."). Wala indicates
the Second Circuit's unwillingness to expand the CIMT inquiry. In the BIA decision on
appeal in Wala, see Wala, No. A44 514 700 (B.I.A. Dec. 27, 2005), the BIA had inferred
facts from a plea colloquy transcript, which was extrinsic to the record of conviction, to
determine that the noncitizen had committed a CIMT rendering him removable. See
Wala, 511 F.3d at 103-05 (describing BIA's reliance on plea colloquy transcript to infer
intent for permanent taking).
In the aggravated felony context, the Second Circuit rejected the Seventh Circuit's
approach in Ali, which permitted consideration of evidence outside the record of
conviction. Gertsenshteyn v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 544 F.3d 137, 146 n.9 (2d Cir. 2008)
("Our decision today is arguably in tension with Ali v. Mukasey . . . in which the Seventh
Circuit 'conclude [d] that when deciding how to classify convictions under criteria that go
beyond the criminal charge-such as the amount of the victim's loss, or whether the crime
is one of 'moral turpitude,' the agency has the discretion to consider evidence beyond the
charging papers and judgment of conviction."' (quoting Ali v. Mukasey, 521 F.3d 737, 743
(7th Cir. 2008))). Analyzing the nature of the noncitizen's underlying actions to see if
they constitute an aggravated felony "undercuts the whole basis of the categorical
approach, which is that what the alien was convicted of determines whether the felony is an
aggravated one and not (unless it is needed to convict) the particular manner in which the
crime was committed." Id. at 146. The same reasoning applies to determining whether
actions constitute a CIMT because the INA uses the word "convicted" in both the
aggravated felony and CIMT provisions. See INA § 212(a) (2) (A) (i) (I), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182 (a) (2) (A) (i) (I) (2006) (using "convicted" for CIMT); INA § 237 (a) (2) (A) (i) (I), 8
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2. Express Rejection of the Silva-Trevino Approach. - Both the Third
and Eighth Circuits have expressly declined to apply the Silva-Trevino approach. The Third Circuit explicitly refused to follow this approach, opting instead to continue its own established methodology for determining
whether a conviction involves moral turpitude: the least culpable conduct test, a limited modified categorical approach, and a prohibition on
inquiry into evidence beyond the record of conviction. 162 The Eighth
Circuit, citing the rationale of the Third Circuit, summarily held that it is
163
not bound by the Attorney General's decision in Silva-Trevino.
The Third Circuit rejected the realistic probability test for the first
step of the categorical approach, and continues to employ the least culpable conduct test. 16 4 The Third Circuit also retained its restricted version
of the second step, 1 65 limiting the use of the record of conviction only to
the following situations: (1) when the criminal statute contains disjunctive elements, 16 6 or (2) to determine the least culpable conduct that will
sustain a conviction under the statute at issue and whether the least culpable conduct is sufficient to meet the requisite depravity to be a
CIMT.167 Finally, the Third Circuit rejected the third step of Silva-Trevino
and continues to forbid adjudicators from consulting evidence outside of
168
the record of conviction.
Rejecting the realistic probability test, the Jean-Louis court did not
argue that it was an impermissible reading of the INA. Instead, it questioned the use of the realistic probability test from Duenas-Alvarez in the
case before it. 1 69 The court highlighted the difference between the case
before it and Duenas-Alvarez, where the hypothetical conduct presented
by the noncitizen was ambiguous and not a clear violation of the criminal
law at issue. 170 The case before the Jean-Louis court involved a simple
U.S.C. § 1227(a) (2) (A) (i) (I) (same); INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) (2) (A)
(iii) (aggravated felony); see also Jean-Louis v. Att'y Gen., 582 F.3d 462, 473-75 (3d Cir.
2009) (arguing use of "convicted" in INA requires categorical approach).
162. Jean-Louis, 582 F.3d at 465-66, 470-73 (rejecting explicitly Attorney General's
approach in Silva-Trevino and instead applying least culpable conduct test and limited
inquiry into noncitizen's record of conviction); see also Tejwani v. Att'y Gen., 349 F. App'x
719, 722 (3d Cir. 2009) (affirming Jean-Louis and applying least culpable conduct test).
163. Guardado-Garcia v. Holder, 615 F.3d 900, 902 (8th Cir. 2010).
164. Jean-Louis, 582 F.3d at 481-82.
165. Id. at 466 (describing "limited factual inquiry" of second step of categorical
approach).
166. See Singh v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 144, 162 (3d Cir. 2004) (permitting limited
factual inquiry into record of conviction when criminal statute contains disjunctive
elements); see also Jean-Louis, 582 F.3d at 466 (same).
167. See Jean-Louis, 582 F.3d at 471-72 ("[O]ur inquiry [under the modified
categorical approach] remain[s] a limited one, focused on the crime of conviction: we
reviewed only the record of the conviction to ascertain the particular variation of the
statute under which the defendant was convicted.").

168. Id. at 473-75.
169. Id. at 481 ("We seriously doubt that the logic of the Supreme Court in DuenasAlvarez ...

is transferable to the CIMT context.").

170. Id.
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assault statute where the elements were clear and did not require any
"application of the legal imagination." 17 1 The second reason provided by
the court to retain the least culpable conduct approach was to maintain
predictability in the established body of case law for noncitizens facing
172
immigration consequences from criminal convictions.
The Third Circuit "conclude [d] that deference is not owed to SilvaTrevino's novel [third step]" because it is based on an impermissible reading of the INA, which the Third Circuit found is clear in endorsing the
categorical approach. 173 The Jean-Louis court focused on the use of "convicted" in the INA, and argued that it limits inquiry to the criminal conviction and not the specific acts underlying the conviction.1 74 The Third
Circuit reinforced its conclusion with the fact that "the BIA, prior attorneys general, and numerous courts of appeals have repeatedly held that
the term 'convicted' forecloses individualized inquiry [into a noncitizen's] specific conduct and does not permit examination of extra1 75
record evidence."
The Eighth Circuit in Guardado-Garciav. Holder, citing Jean-Louis, declined to apply the Silva-Trevino approach for CIMTs. 176 The GuardadoGarcia court concluded that it was "bound by [its] circuit's precedent,
and to the extent Silva-Trevino [was] inconsistent, [the court] adhere [d]
to circuit law."1 77 The Eighth Circuit held that the petitioner's due pro171. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
172. Id. at 481-82.
173. Id. at 470, 473-75. The Jean-Louis court maintained that any "ambiguity that the
Attorney General perceives in the INA is an ambiguity of his own making, not grounded in
the text of the statute, and certainly not grounded in the BIA's own rulings or
jurisprudence of courts of appeals going back for over a century." Id. at 472-73 & n.12
(describing Chevron deference as not mandating deference to agency's construction of
statute if "Congress has spoken clearly on the precise issue" or "where an agency
interpretation reflects an impermissible construction of the statute"). For a more detailed
explanation of Chevron deference, see supra note 46.
174. Id. at 474 ("[T]he CIMT determination focuses on the crime of which the alien
was convicted-not the specific acts that the alien may have committed."); see INA
§ 101(a)(48)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A) (2006) (defining "conviction"); INA
§ 240(c) (3) (B), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c) (3) (B) (listing documents that constitute proof of
criminal conviction); supra note 19 (providing definition of "conviction" under INA).
Other reasons advanced by the Third Circuit for its rejection of the Silva-Trevino
approach were "the lack of transparency [regarding the Attorney General's certification],
coupled with the absence of input by interested stakeholders." Jean-Louis, 582 F.3d at 471
n.11. For a further discussion of the lack of transparency surrounding the Attorney
General's sua sponte certification, see supra note 109.
175. Jean-Louis, 582 F.3d at 473-74 (footnotes omitted); see also id. at 473-74
nn.14-16 (listing and describing precedent that does not permit inquiry into facts
underlying conviction).
176. Guardado-Garcia v. Holder, 615 F.3d 900, 902 (8th Cir. 2010).
177. Id. The Guardado-Garciacourt simply cited the Third Circuit's conclusion that
"deference is not owed to Silva-Trevino's novel approach," without delving into the Third
Circuit's rationale. Id. (quoting Jean-Louis, 582 F.3d at 470-73). The Eighth Circuit also
did not elaborate on how Silva-Trevino's approach is inconsistent with Eighth Circuit
precedent. Id.
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cess rights were not violated when the BIA did not follow Silva-Trevino in
determining whether his crime was a CIMT because the BIA's analysis was
178
consistent with Eighth Circuit precedent.
III. REALISTIC PROBABILITY TEST, NARROw MODIFIED CATEGORICAL
APPROACH, AND REJECTION OF THE THIRD STEP AS A
UNIFORM SOLUTION

In light of the various approaches used by the federal circuit courts
and the administrative courts to determine whether a particular conviction involves moral turpitude, this Note proposes uniform adoption of
the realistic probability test from Duenas-Alvarez for the first step of the
categorical approach, narrow use of the record of conviction for the second step, and outright rejection of the third step used by the Attorney
General in Silva-Trevino. Because there is currently no uniform test for
the categorical approach, noncitizens are subject to different standards
for removal on CIMT grounds. The immigration consequences of criminal convictions should not depend on the jurisdiction in which the removal proceedings are initiated; rather, federal immigration consequences should be uniform across the country.
A. Step 1: Adjudicators Should Adopt the Realistic Probability Test
To rectify the current inconsistency in the first step of the categorical
approach, 179 the federal circuit courts and administrative courts should
uniformly adopt the realistic probability test from Duenas-Alvarez for the
first step of the categorical approach for the following reasons: The realistic probability test comports with Supreme Court immigration precedent and the statutory language of the INA, and it also improves the accuracy of determining whether a conviction involves moral turpitude while
178. Id. The petitioner claimed that his due process rights were violated when the
BIA did not follow Silva-Trevino, which he argued it was bound to follow. He claimed that
"its failure to do so [was] tantamount to an agency failing to follow its own rules." Id.
179. Circuits are currently inconsistent in their CIMT jurisprudence, articulating the
use of one test for the categorical approach, but in practice occasionally using another.
For example, the Eleventh Circuit, although generally using the minimum criminal
conduct test for the categorical approach, has in some cases failed to consider the
minimum criminal conduct that would sustain a conviction under the statute, instead
opting for a test that more closely resembles the realistic probability test. See Sharpless,
supra note 56, at 1015-16 (describing inconsistency in Eleventh Circuit's CIMT
jurisprudence). For example, in Sosa-Martinez v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 420 F.3d 1338, 1341-42
(11th Cir. 2005), when considering a conviction for intentional battery, the court did not
analyze whether the minimal conduct that could be convicted under the statute would
necessarily involve moral turpitude. See Sharpless, supra note 56, at 1015-16. Another
example is the Sixth Circuit, which states the realistic probability test by name but in fact
uses a test that more closely resembles the common case approach. See supra note 148
and accompanying text (describing Sixth Circuit's "ordinary case" approach); see also
supra note 66 (describing common case approach).
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still affording requisite protection to a noncitizen to prevent unjustified
removal.
Not only would standardized use of the realistic probability test decrease disparity among the circuits regarding CIMT jurisprudence, it
would also make consistent the tests used for two criminal grounds for
removal: CIMTs and aggravated felonies.18 0 The realistic probability test
for CIMTs follows Supreme Court precedent in Duenas-Alvarez, which
used this test to determine whether a crime was an aggravated felony for
immigration purposes. 18 1 Instead of increasing unpredictability, as contended by critics of the realistic probability test,' 82 using the same test for
aggravated felonies and CIMTs would likely decrease confusion in removaljurisprudence. 18 3 In fact, the realistic probability test is not new to
180. For further discussion regarding the importance of uniformity when considering
immigration consequences of state criminal convictions, see generally Iris Bennett, Note,
The Unconstitutionality of Nonuniform Immigration Consequences of "Aggravated
Felony" Convictions, 74 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1696, 1701 n.19, 1712-14 (1999) (discussing
importance of uniformity in light of naturalization clause of Constitution).
181. Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183, 193 (2007). A list of aggravated
felonies is provided in section 101(a) (43) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (2006).
Aggravated felonies comprise a ground for removal under the INA.
INA
§ 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). The categorical and modified
categorical approaches from Taylor, which are used in the CIMT context, see supra Part
I.B, are also used for determining whether a conviction is for an aggravated felony. See
Gertsenshteyn v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 544 F.3d 137, 146 (2d Cir. 2008) ("[T]he
immigration court must look to what was required to convict the alien, i.e., the elements of
the crime of conviction."); United States v. Reyes-Castro, 13 F.3d 377, 379 (10th Cir. 1993)
(using Taylor's categorical approach for aggravated felonies under § 16(b) to determine if
crime is aggravated felony in immigration context); Carachuri-Rosendo, 24 I. & N. Dec.
382, 393 (B.I.A. 2007) ("[T]he proper question is not whether the respondent's personal
circumstances make him the type of person who could have been prosecuted as a Federal
felon, but rather whether he has a State conviction for an offense that proscribes conduct
punishable as a felony under Federal law." (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted)).
Additionally, just as for CIMTs, if the criminal statute is divisible, the factfinder is
permitted to consider the record of conviction to establish under which portion of the
statute the noncitizen was convicted, in order to determine if the conviction is for an
aggravated felony. See Sweetser, 22 I. & N. Dec. 709, 714 (B.I.A. 1999) ("Where a statute
under which an alien was convicted is divisible, we look to the record of conviction ....
This approach does not involve an inquiry into facts previously presented and tried.
Instead the focus is on the elements required to sustain the conviction.").
However, there is no specific criminal ground of inadmissibility for aggravated
felonies. Because aggravated felonies are generally CIMTs, the practical consequence of a
noncitizen with an aggravated felony conviction who is seeking admission is that she would
likely be inadmissible on CIMT grounds.
182. See Jean-Louis, 582 F.3d at 481-82 (holding that Third Circuit will continue to
apply least culpable conduct test to maintain predictability); Patricia S. Mann, Matter of
Silva-Trevino: An Update on Crimes Involving Moral Turpitude, in Basic Immigration Law
2009, at 247, 258 (2009) (arguing Attorney General's "new" realistic probability test
overturns one hundred years of precedent); see also supra note 172 and accompanying
text (describing Third Circuit's argument that Silva-Trevino approach is unpredictable).
183. Court opinions have occasionally cited aggravated felony and CIMT precedent
interchangeably, citing for example, aggravated felony precedent in a CIMT case. For
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the immigration context, as many circuit courts have explicitly adopted
this test to determine whether a particular conviction is an aggravated
18 4
felony or a CIMT.
Although Duenas-Alvarez arose in the aggravated felony context, the
categorical approach determining the immigration consequences for aggravated felonies and CIMTs should be identical because of the use of the
word "convicted" for both in the INA. Under the INA, a noncitizen "convicted" of a CIMT or an aggravated felony will face removal.' 8 5 The language of the INA does not suggest a reason why the categorical approaches should be different for aggravated felonies and CIMTs. In fact,
the definition of "conviction" used in the INA is consistent across all types
18 6
of removal proceedings.
The realistic probability test is also consistent with the use of the
word "convicted" in the CIMT provisions of the INA: The realistic
probability test maintains the categorical nature of the inquiry because it
does not permit consideration of the specific acts committed by the
noncitizen.' 8 7 Although the noncitizen can point to her own case to
show that the statute has been applied to conduct that does not involve
moral turpitude, the purpose of this inquiry is not to show that the nonciinstance, the Third Circuit in Jean-Louis cited Martinez v. Mukasey, 551 F.3d 113 (2d Cir.
2008), as a case that imported the realistic probability test into the CIMT context. 582 F.3d
at 481. Martinez, however, is an aggravated felony case, not a CIMT case, that uses the least
criminal conduct (or least culpable conduct) test. Martinez, 551 F.3d at 122 (holding
"[u]nder the categorical approach, a showing that the minimum conduct for which [the
noncitizen] was convicted was not an aggravated felony suffices" to show that he "has not
been convicted of an aggravated felony").
184. See Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. at 193 (establishing realistic probability test). The
Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits have explicitly adopted the realistic probability test from
Duenas-Alvarez for aggravated felonies: Ibeagwa v. Mukasey, 287 F. App'x 7, 9 (9th Cir.
2008) (citing Duenas-Alvarez's realistic probability test for aggravated felonies); United
States v. Diaz-Ibarra, 522 F.3d 343, 348 (4th Cir. 2008) (same); United States v. RamosSanchez, 483 F.3d 400, 403-04 (5th Cir. 2007) (same). See also supra Part II.B.l.a (listing
circuits that follow realistic probability test for first step of categorical approach for
CIMTs).
185. INA § 237(a) (2) (A) (i) (I), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) (2) (A) (i) (I); INA
§ 237(a) (2) (A) (iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) (2) (A) (iii). For a discussion of how use of the word
"convicted" in the INA precludes consideration of the noncitizen's underlying conduct in
favor of using the categorical approach, see supra notes 173-175 and accompanying text.
186. INA § 101(a)(48)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (48) (A) (providing definition of
"conviction"); see also supra note 19 (same).
187. As such, the realistic probability test does not uproot existing jurisprudence as
suggested by the Third Circuit in Jean-Louis. See supra note 172 and accompanying text
(describing Third Circuit's preference for least culpable conduct test because it maintains
predictability). Inquiry into the noncitizen's underlying conduct is still not permitted
under the realistic probability test. The third step of the Silva-Trevino approach is only
used after the first and second steps of the categorical approach are inconclusive.
Consideration of extrinsic evidence beyond the record of conviction is thus not permitted
when analyzing the criminal statute under the realistic probability test. Cf. Silva-Trevino,
24 I. & N. Dec. 687, 690 (Op. Att'y Gen. 2008) (permitting judges to inquire "beyond the
formal record of conviction" only when it is "inconclusive").
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tizen's particular actions do not involve moral turpitude. Rather, the purpose is to show that since acts that do not involve moral turpitude are
prosecuted under the criminal statute, convictions under the statute do
not categorically involve moral turpitude. 188 Because the realistic
probability test is a permissible reading of the INA, federal courts should
defer to the Attorney General's construction of the INA regarding the
first step of the categorical approach under Chevron. 189 In fact, the Third
Circuit did not hold that the realistic probability test was an impermissible reading of the statute; instead it provided policy reasons for the outright rejection of the importation of the realistic probability test into the
CIMT context. 190
Policy considerations, however, weigh in favor of adopting the realistic probability test, as it balances both fairness and accuracy concerns by
reducing the overinclusiveness of the common case approach and the
underinclusiveness of the least culpable conduct test. The common case
approach, another variant of the first step of the categorical approach,
would sweep in convictions that do not involve moral turpitude by basing
the determination on whether the common case prosecuted under the
statute involves moral turpitude.1 9 1 Although removal is not punitive in a
criminal sense, its practical ramifications are severe. Therefore, adjudicators should ensure that convictions that do not actually involve moral turpitude are not treated as if they do. 19 2 The least culpable conduct test is
188. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. at 186, 193 (stating purpose of realistic probability test is
to show "the State would apply its statute to conduct that falls outside the generic
definition of a crime," not to consider "the facts of the particular prior case").
189. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43
(1984) (holding federal courts must defer to permissible agency interpretations of
ambiguous statutes).
190. Jean-Louis v. Att'y Gen., 582 F.3d 462, 481-82 (3d Cir. 2009) (distinguishing
Duenas-Alvarez and decrying unpredictability of realistic probability test); see supra notes
170-172 and accompanying text (describing Third Circuit's rationale for rejecting realistic
probability test).
191. Under the common case approach, circumstances that may reduce a
noncitizen's moral blameworthiness but are not reflected in a generic conviction under
the statute will not be considered when determining whether the conviction is one that
involves moral turpitude. See Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 697 (describing overinclusive
nature of common case approach); see also supra note 66 (describing common case
approach).
192. Cf. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1481 (2010) ("We have long recognized
that deportation is a particularly severe penalty .... " (internal quotation omitted));Jordan
v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 231 (1951) (recognizing "grave nature of deportation," and
therefore applying vagueness doctrine to CIMTs even though not generally used in civil
context); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 739-40 (1893) (Brewer, J.,
dissenting) (stating deportation is "punishment cruel and severe"). In light of the
harshness of deportation, another protection that is afforded in the immigration context
but not generally in civil cases is the rule of lenity, whereby ambiguous statutory language
in the deportation provisions of the INA is construed in favor of the noncitizen. See INS v.
St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 320 (2001) (recognizing "longstanding principle of construing any
lingering ambiguities in deportation statutes in favor of the alien" (quoting INS v. CardozaFonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 449 (1987))); Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948)
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underinclusive because if the statute encompasses conduct that does not
involve moral turpitude, even hypothetical conduct that may never be
prosecuted, then all convictions under that statute would categorically
not involve moral turpitude. 19 3 Duenas-Alvarez's realistic probability test
seeks to end exercises in "legal imagination" when analyzing state criminal statutes. 19 4 Because some state statutes are drafted more broadly than
others, a conviction under a more broadly drafted statute would not result in immigration consequences whereas a conviction under a more
narrowly-written criminal statute would result in inadmissibility or deportability. The application of immigration laws should not depend on
the wording of criminal statutes but on the nature of convictions under
19 5
the statute.
Furthermore, the realistic probability test does not impermissibly
shift the burden of proof to the noncitizen because the government still
has to show that the noncitizen satisfies the grounds for deportability. 196
(holding ambiguities should be resolved in favor of noncitizen "because deportation is a
drastic measure and at times the equivalent of banishment or exile"). See generally Brian
G. Slocum, The Immigration Rule of Lenity and Chevron Deference, 17 Geo. Immigr. L.J.
515, 519-25 (2003) (describing rule of lenity in immigration context).
Furthermore, because of the severity of deportation, the rationale behind not
sweeping in convictions that do not involve moral turpitude is similar to the rationale for
having a higher burden of proof for criminal cases. See Matthew C. Waxman, Detention as
Targeting: Standards of Certainty and Detention of Suspected Terrorists, 108 Colum. L.
Rev. 1365, 1372-74 (2008) (describing harsh penalties resulting from criminal convictions
as part of rationale for avoiding false positives in criminal context).
193. See supra notes 98, 108, and accompanying text (illustrating application of least
culpable conduct test to Texas criminal statute). The least culpable conduct test would
allow noncitizens whose actions in fact do involve moral turpitude to enter or remain in
the United States if the criminal statute does not categorically involve moral turpitude. See
Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. at 697 (describing underinclusiveness of least culpable conduct
test); supra notes 67-71 and accompanying text (describing least culpable conduct test).
194. Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183, 192-93 (2007); see also Silva-Trevino,
24 I. & N. Dec. at 698 ("[T]he 'realistic probability' approach is grounded in the
realization that immigration penalties ought to be based on criminal laws as they are
actually applied."); Sharpless, supra note 56, at 1005 n.109 ("The [Duenas-Alvarez] court
was simply making the unsurprising statement that, when relying on a state court
interpretation of statutory elements, litigants must be able to point to case law to support
their hypothetical prosecutions.").
195. See supra note 55 and accompanying text (listing case law that supports notion
that state labels for crimes should not control inquiry for federal immigration
consequences).
196. The burden of proof is on the noncitizen to demonstrate admissibility. In the
case of a returning LPR, subsections 101(a)(13)(C)(iii) and (v) of the INA, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101 (a) (13) (C) (iii) and (v), state respectively that after "[engaging] in illegal activity
after having departed the United States" or "[having] committed an offense identified in
section 212(a)(2)," an LPR will be treated as seeking admission into the United States,
putting the burden of proof on the noncitizen to show admissibility. See INA
§ 240(c) (2) (A), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c) (2) (A) (2006) (providing that noncitizen applying for
admission has burden of establishing that she "is clearly and beyond doubt entitled to be
admitted and is not inadmissible under section 212"); 8 C.F.R. § 1240.8(c) (2010)
(indicating a noncitizen not lawfully in the United States "pursuant to a prior
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Critics of the realistic probability test have eschewed this test, arguing that
it impermissibly shifts the burden for deportation because the noncitizen
has to present cases showing that the statute was used to prosecute conduct that does not involve moral turpitude.1 9 7 The burden of proof, however, remains with the government because the government needs to
show by clear and convincing evidence that the noncitizen's conviction
involves moral turpitude and that the statute has not been applied to
conduct that does not involve moral turpitude.' 9 8 By pointing to cases
where the statute has been applied to prosecute conduct that does not
involve moral turpitude, the noncitizen is rebutting the government's argument that all convictions under the criminal statute involve moral turpitude. The use of this evidence is similar to the use of hypothetical conduct that the criminal statute would reach under the least culpable
conduct test. 199
The Third Circuit also argued that the realistic probability test may
be inapplicable in cases where the crime in question is unambiguously
not a CIMT. That is, when the statute's plain language clearly encompasses conduct that does not involve moral turpitude, the adjudicator
does not have to use the realistic probability test in the first step of the
categorical approach to conclude that the crime cannot categorically involve moral turpitude. 20 0 The Third Circuit's reading, however, does not
admission .. . must prove that he or she is clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be
admitted to the United States and is not inadmissible as charged"); see also Rodriguez v.
Mukasey, 519 F.3d 773, 776 (8th Cir. 2008) ("[The noncitizen] bore the burden of proving
clearly and beyond doubt that he was not inadmissible."); Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. at
709 ("[Tihe burden is on respondent to establish 'clearly and beyond doubt' that he is
'not inadmissible.'"). The burden of proof for deportation, however, is on the
government. See INA § 240(c) (3) (A), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c) (3) (A) ("In [a deportation]
proceeding the [government] has the burden of establishing by clear and convincing
evidence that . . . the alien is deportable."). One criticism of Silva-Trevino is that the
Attorney General did not address the fact that the INA puts the burden of proof on the
government to show that a noncitizen is deportable. See infra note 197 and accompanying
text (discussing possibility of impermissible burden shifting as result of Silva-Trevino).
197. See, e.g., Nat'l Lawyers Guild, supra note 32, § 6:3 ("[T]he decision in SilvaTrevino might be read as impermissibly placing the burden of proof on the noncitizen
since the government bears the burden of proof to establish the ground of deportability
under the INA."); Brief for Am. Immigr. Lawyers Ass'n et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondent, supra note 61, at 18 n.l ("[A]s the Attorney General himself acknowledges
without resolving, the framework he posits calls into question the statutory burden of proof
and will be more complicated in removal cases .... ." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
198. See INA § 240(c) (3) (A), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c) (3) (A) (providing government "has
the burden of establishing by clear and convincing evidence that, in the case of an alien
who has been admitted to the United States, the alien is deportable").
199. See supra note 70 and accompanying text (describing use of hypothetical
convictions in least culpable conduct test).
200. Jean-Louis v. Att'y Gen., 582 F.3d 462, 481 (3d Cir. 2009); see United States v.
Grisel, 488 F.3d 844, 845-46, 850 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc) (holding that in "violent
felony" context for Armed Career Criminal Act, realistic probability test does not apply if
criminal offense is clearly delineated by plain language of statute). The Ninth Circuit,
however, does use the realistic probability test for instances where the plain meaning of the
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preclude the realistic probability test when the elements of a statute can
be satisfied by a range of acts, some of which although not involving
moral turpitude, would not actually be prosecuted under it.
B. Second Step: Adjudicators Should Uniformly Limit Their Use of the Record
of Conviction
The circuit courts and the BIA are currently inconsistent in their
application of the second step of the categorical approach, even within a
given circuit. 20 1 Adjudicators should uniformly use the record of conviction for the narrow purpose of determining under which portion of a
criminal statute the noncitizen was convicted. 20 2 By limiting the use of
the record of conviction to facts decided by the criminal adjudicator, the
inquiry would be consistent with the use of "convicted" in the relevant
20 3
INA provisions.
Furthermore, adjudicators should bear in mind the severity of deportation and afford protections to noncitizens to avoid unfair application of
the immigration laws by only allowing consideration of the record of conviction for this narrow purpose. 20 4 Facts in the record of conviction may
not have been found by the criminal factfinder. If adjudicators in the
immigration context relied on facts not necessarily found by the criminal
factfinder, they would "inevitably [be] adjudicat[ing] the truth of these
facts (i.e., the underlying conduct) in the first instance" without giving
the noncitizen an adequate opportunity to defend against them. 20 5 The
role of the adjudicator for immigration cases is not to determine guilt,
but to decide if the facts found by the criminal adjudicator result in immi2 6
gration consequences. 0
statute is not clear. See supra note 74 (comparing different applications of realistic
probability test). The Third Circuit's language does not seem to explicitly preclude use of
the realistic probability test when the plain meaning is not clear. See Jean-Louis, 582 F.3d
at 481-82 (declining to use realistic probability test in case where elements of crime are
"clear" and approvingly citing Ninth Circuit's reasoning in Nicanor-Romero).
201. See supra notes 82-90 and accompanying text (describing variations in modified
categorical approach).
202. See supra notes 82-84 (discussing majority view of modified categorical
approach, where record of conviction is used only to determine under what portion of
statute noncitizen was convicted).
203. INA § 212(a) (2) (A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (2) (A) (i); INA § 237(a) (2) (A) (i) (I), 8
U.S.C. § 1227(a) (2) (A) (i) (I).
204. Because the text of the INA is ambiguous in regards to which method
adjudicators should use to determine whether a conviction involves moral turpitude, the
rule of lenity for the construction of ambiguous statutes in the immigration context
provides that ambiguity should be resolved in favor of the noncitizen. See supra note 192
(discussing protections not generally offered to civil defendants but afforded to
noncitizens in deportation proceedings because of severity of deportation as penalty).
205. Sharpless, supra note 56, at 1010-11.
206. See, e.g., INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038 (1984) (stating role of is

U

to "order deportation," and not to "adjudicate guilt"); see infra notes 212-213 and

accompanying text (discussing role of J).
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C. Silva-Trevino's Third Step Should Be ReJected
The Attorney General's third step, which permits inquiry into any
additional evidence, should not be followed when determining whether a
conviction involves moral turpitude. Because this third step is contrary to
the use of "convicted" in the INA, federal circuit courts should not defer
to this impermissible reading of the statutory language. The third step
will also increase unfairness, inconsistency, and inefficiency in the application of the CIMT provisions of the INA.
Because the third step proposed by the Attorney General would allow consideration of the underlying actions of the noncitizen beyond the
elements of the charged offense, it does not adhere to the language of
the INA. As the Third Circuit in Jean-Louis concluded, the use of the
word "convicted," as opposed to "committed," focuses the immigration
inquiry on the elements of the statute and not the actions of the noncitizen. 20 7 Although the INA does use "committed" in section 212(a) (2) (A) (i) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (2) (A) (i), it is used in
reference to noncitizens who admit to a crime, but not in reference to
convictions. The Attorney General's third step veers away from the categorical approach by allowing the factfinder to see if the acts committed
by the noncitizen, rather than the elements for conviction, involve moral
turpitude. Therefore, as the Third Circuit found, the Attorney General's
third step does not merit deference under Chevron because it is based on
an impermissible reading of the INA: It disregards the clear language in
°8
the INA that focuses on a conviction for a CIMT.2
Similar to broad use of the record of conviction in step two of the
categorical approach, 20 9 Silva-Trevino's third step will also increase unfairness in removal proceedings by allowing "de novo fact finding on the conduct underlying the criminal court conviction," which is contrary to the
general protections given to noncitizens in removal proceedings in light
of the severity of deportation. 2 10 Noncitizens may not have had the op207. Jean-Louis v. Att'y Gen., 582 F.3d 462, 473-74 (3d Cir. 2009) (explaining use of
"convicted" in INA "explicitly limits the inquiry to the record of conviction or comparable
judicial record evidence-that the CIMT determination focuses on the crime of which the
alien was convicted-not the specific acts that the alien may have committed" (citation
omitted)); see supra note 19 (providing definition of "conviction" in INA).
208. For a discussion of Chevron deference, see supra notes 46-50 and accompanying
text. For the Third Circuit's argument against the adoption of Silva-Trevino's third step,
see Jean-Louis, 582 F.3d at 473-75; see also supra notes 173-175 and accompanying text
(detailing reasoning of Jean-Louis court for not deferring to third step of Silva-Trevino).
209. See supra notes 204-206 and accompanying text (critiquing broad use of record
of conviction in modified categorical approach).
210. See Letter from Carolyn B. Lamm, President, Am. Bar Assoc., to Eric H. Holder,
U.S. Att'y Gen. 1-2 (Jan. 22, 2010), available at http://www.abanet.org/poladv/letters/
immigration/201Ojan26_silvatrevinoj.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) ("It is
fundamentally unfair to force immigrants to relitigate their criminal cases in immigration
court hearings that are not governed by formal rules of evidence, where the Sixth
Amendment rights to appointed counsel and to a trial by jury do not apply, and where the
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portunity to challenge certain facts in a criminal proceeding if they were
not essential elements of the conviction. 2 11 Furthermore, because these
nonelement facts were not found by the criminal factfinder, the IJ would
necessarily be deciding the truth of the underlying facts in the criminal
conviction in the first instance, which is an impermissible role for an
IU.2 12 The function of an IJ is not to determine guilt or innocence, or the
truth of facts underlying the criminal conviction, but only to analyze a
2 13
conviction by a criminal court for immigration consequences.
The Attorney General's third step will amplify inconsistency in the
application of the INA's CIMT provisions. For example, there will be increased discrepancy if some court records are more complete than others
or if some IJs consider more external evidence than others.2 14 Although
the Attorney General in Silva-Trevino stated that criminal convictions may
not be relitigated in immigration courts, 2 15 this restriction is insufficient.
For example, in the second step of the inquiry, use of additional evidence
is restricted to the record of conviction ensuring that adjudicators will use
the same underlying documents to gather evidence. However, with very
little limitation on the type of evidence that can be used in the third step
of Silva-Trevino, discretion will be solely in the hands of IJs as to what
evidence to consider.
Finally, the third step of the Silva-Trevino approach will increase inefficiency in CIMT adjudication in already overburdened courts. 216 One of
Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule and Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination do not apply with full force.").
211. See Sharpless, supra note 56, at 984-85 (stating because only element facts can
lead to criminal conviction, "[a] defendant therefore has no reason to dispute (or to
exclude from the record) nonelement facts").
212. See id. at 1032 ("[B]ecause immigration adjudicators have no statutory authority
to adjudicate guilt or innocence, they cannot rely on facts unless they have already been
proven beyond a reasonable doubt in the prior criminal proceeding. The role of
adjudicators is appropriately limited to determining what was already decided in the prior
proceeding." (citation omitted)).
213. United States ex rel. Mylius v. Uhl, 210 F. 860, 863 (2d Cir. 1914); Immigration
Laws-Moral Turpitude-Political
Offense-Abnormal Conditions in Foreign
Jurisdiction, 39 Op. Att'y Gen. 215, 220 (1938) ("[N]either courts nor immigration officers
may go outside such record to determine facts or whether in the particular instance the
alien's conduct was immoral.").
214. R-, 6 I. & N. Dec. 444, 448 n.2 (B.I.A. 1954) (arguing categorical approach
"eliminates the situation where a nonjudicial agency retries a judicial matter ... [and]
prevents the situation occurring where two people convicted under the same specific law
are given different treatment because one indictment may contain a fuller or different
description of the same act than the other indictment; and makes for uniform
administration of law").
215. Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. 687, 690 (Op. Att'y Gen. 2008) ("[The third step] is
not an occasion to relitigate facts or determinations made in the earlier criminal
proceeding.").
216. See Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse, Syracuse Univ., As FY 2010
Ends, Immigration Case Backlog Still Growing (2010), available at http://trac.syr.edu/
immigration/reports/242/ (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (reporting "number of
cases awaiting resolution before the Immigration Courts reached a new all-time high");
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the underlying rationales for adopting a categorical approach was to en2 17
sure speedy proceedings and to avoid relitigating criminal convictions.
By allowing consideration of any additional evidence, instead of using a
categorical approach focused on the statute of conviction, the CIMT inquiry will be greatly expanded to permit inquiry into the underlying actions of noncitizens in removal proceedings.
CONCLUSION

The federal circuit courts and the administrative courts should uniformly adopt the realistic probability test as suggested by Silva-Trevino, but
should reject the third step that considers evidence beyond the record of
conviction. The deportation and inadmissibility provisions of the INA reflect a policy choice by Congress to prevent noncitizens with certain types
of criminal convictions from entering and remaining in the United
States. The realistic probability test is most able to give effect to that policy choice by increasing accuracy in the consideration of criminal convictions for immigration consequences without capturing noncitizens who
have not in fact committed a CIMT.
Even though accuracy should be increased, protections for the
noncitizen should not be sacrificed in light of the grave nature of deportation. Thus, adjudicators should reject Silva-Trevino's third step to protect a noncitizen in removal proceedings from the use of facts that were
not found in the criminal proceeding. A consistent approach among the
administrative courts and the federal circuit courts would provide for a
uniform application of the immigration laws. A uniform policy would
ensure that immigration laws do not depend on the location of removal
proceedings or on the wording of criminal statutes, but on a consistent
nationwide application of the immigration laws.

Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse, Syracuse Univ., Immigration Courts Taking
Longer to Reach Decisions (2010), available at http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/
244/ (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (reporting "Immigration Courts took 20
percent longer to act on cases before them than they did the previous year"); see also supra
note 15 and accompanying text (providing statistics for CIMT cases).
217. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text (providing rationale behind
adoption of categorical approach).

